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A B O U T T H E I P T S R E P O R T 
r be IPTS Report was launched in December 1995, on the request and under the auspices of Commissioner Cresson. What seemed like a daunting challenge in late 1995, now appears in retrospect 
as a crucial galvaniser of the IPTS' energies and skills. 
The Report has published articles in numerous areas, maintaining a rough balance between them, and 
exploiting interdisciplinari!}' asfar as possible. Articles are deemed prospectively relevant if they attempt to 
explore issues not yet on the policymaker's agenda (but projected to be there sooner or later), or 
underappreciated aspects of issues already on the policymaker's agenda. The long drafting and redrafting 
process, based on a series of interactive consultations with outside experts, guarantees quality control. 
The clearest indication of the report's success is that it is being read. An initial print run of 2000 for the first 
issue (00) in December 1995 looked optimistic at the time, but issue 00 has since turned into a collector's 
item. Tbtal readership rose to around 10,000 in 1997, with readers continuing to be drawn from a variety 
of backgrounds and regions world-wide, and in 1998 a shift in emphasis towards the electronic version on 
the Web has begun. 
The laurels the publication is reaping are rendering it attractive for authors from outside the Commission. 
We have already published contributions by authors from such renowned itistitutions as the Dutch TNO, the 
German VD1, the Italian ENEA a/id the US Council of Strategic and International Studies. 
Moreover, the IPTS formally collaborates on the production of the IPTS Report with a group of prestigious 
European institutions, with whom the IPTS has formed the European Science and Technology Observatory 
(ESTO), an important part of the remit of the IPTS. The IPTS Report is the most visible manifestation of this 
collaboration. 
The Report is produced simultaneously in four languages (English, French, German and Spanish) by the 
IPTS; to these one could add the Italian translation volunteered by ENEA: yet another sign of the Report's 
increasing visibili!): The fact that it is not only available in several languages, but also largely prepared and 
produced on the Internet World Wide Web, makes it quite an uncommon undertaking. 
We shall continue to endeavour to find the best way of fulfilling the expectations of our quite diverse 
readership, avoiding oversimplification, as well as encyclopaedic reviews and the inaccessibility of academic 
journals. The key is to remind ourselves, as well as the readers, that we cannot be all things to all people, 
that it is importan! to carve out our niche and conlinue optimally exploring and exploiting it, Imping to 
illuminate topics under a new, revealing light for the benefit of the readers, in order to prepare them for 
managing the challenges ahead. 
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2 Editorial 
innovation and Technology Policy 
5 Public Research Programmes: Socio­economic Impact Assessment and 
User Needs 
The explicit socio­economic aims of the Fifth Framework Programme make assessing 
the impact of RTD programmes an essential part of monitoring its success. However, 
there are a number of obstacles to approaches which place undue reliance on narrow 
measuring exercises. 
10 Additionally of Publicly­Funded RTD Programmes 
The concept of additionality has frequently been used to direct public funding of techno­
logy programmes to areas not covered by private investment. However a reassessment of 
the assumptions underlying it may help improve evaluation practices. 
16 Distributed Intelligence: Combining Evaluation, Foresight and 
_ Technology Assessment 
The linking of research­related expertise provides invaluable input to European policy­
making. The task set up in the Maastricht Treaty to arrive at a coordinated European 
science, research and technology policy can be facilitated by the systematic use of 
intelligence tools. 
Regional Development 
23 Lessons from RTDI Enhancement in Less­Favoured Regions 
Policy­makers in less­favoured regions are increasingly adopting strategies that incorporate . ψ 
technology­support and development. However, behavioural patterns, absorptive 
capabilities and evaluation techniques dictate the ultimate success of specific measures. 
Methods and Foresight 
30 Evaluating the Scientific Excellence of Research Programmes: a Pivot of 
Decision­Making 
Policy­makers need accurate and objective information about the quality of scientific 
research if they are to direct funding optimally. Bibliometric tools can back up expert 
opinion to give a more objective way of pinpointing scientific excellence. 
38 Evaluating the impact of Technology Transfers from Public Research 
Laboratories to Private Firms 
Research laboratories are under increasing pressure to evaluate the economic impact of 
their work. However, existing indicators are poorly equipped to grasp the characteristics 
of innovation. 
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E D I T O R I A L 
Isidoros Karatzas and Gilbert Fayl, Evaluation Unit, DC Research1 
2 
T he European Commission's experience in the evaluation of RTD programmes covers a period of more than 2 decades. From 1980 to 1994 more than 70 programme evaluations 
and over 40 supporting studies have been carried out, 
involving more than 500 European experts. The 
Commission's efforts, coupled with major evaluation 
activities in the Member States, have been a catalyst 
for the establishment of a European evaluation 
community, where extensive knowledge transfer, 
sharing of experience and application of good 
practices is fostered. 
The evaluation efforts have had a double focus: to 
provide managers with a tool for real-time 
improvement of programme implementation and to 
provide a performance and impact measurement in 
order to influence the design of the new activities. 
Up until 1994, although it was based on a sound 
methodology, the interface with policy preparation 
was not as direct as one would have wished. In 1994, 
with the introduction of the fourth Framework 
Programme on RTD activities (FP4), the evaluation 
system underwent a major overhaul. Firstly, the 
evaluation efforts were harmonized across all RTD 
programmes with an increased emphasis on the 
transparency, democratic accountability and better 
synchronization of the evaluation and policy 
functions. Secondly, the evaluation of the impact of 
research activities became the main focus. 
The new scheme introduced a continuous moni-
toring process, reporting annually, and a five-year 
assessment earned out halfway through programme 
implementation, covering two subsequent pro-
grammes and reporting in time for the preparation of 
the new programme. Thus, the five-year assessment 
combines an ex-post evaluation of the previous 
programme and a mid-term review of the ongoing one. 
The backbone of the evaluation process has remained 
the use of external independent expert panels. 
Independent expert panels assist in the ongoing 
monitoring. Separate panels are appointed to conduct 
the five-year assessments. Both the monitoring and 
five-year assessment are carried out concurrently for all 
specific programmes and the results serve as a major 
input to the Framework Programme level exercises. 
With the introduction of the new scheme, the 
evaluation process became a topic of intense and 
continuous internal discussions in an effort to address 
the needs of its primary users, which include the RTD 
programme managere and the decision-makers in the 
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. For 
this purpose the Interservice Croup for Monitoring and 
5-Year Assessment was established and is composed of 
representatives of all Commission's Directorate-
Generals (DGs) involved in the implementation of the 
Framework Programme and also including Budget, 
Financial Control and Statistics DGs. 
In addition, the transparency of the process is en-
hanced by introducing a formal feedback mechanism 
requiring the Commission to publish responses to the 
independent experts' recommendations. Subsequent 
panels are also requested to enquire whether the 
recommendations have been implemented. Additional 
feedback from the decision-makers and the national 
RTD actors is received primarily through two channels: 
• the CREST2 Evaluation Sub-committee that reviews 
the evaluation reports and recommends means to 
improve their effectiveness, and 
• the European RTD Evaluation Network3 which is 
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a forum for discussion and analysis of evaluation 
methodology and good practice. 
Evaluation is always a tricky process, not least in 
an area like RTD where the results are, and indeed 
must be, uncertain. It is hoped, therefore, that this 
special issue can also be of help in sharing experience 
and good practice, so that the results of evaluations 
can be viewed with the maximum confidence. The 
underlying theme of each article is the maximization 
of the impact of evaluation work either by targeting 
the methodology or by responding better to the users 
needs. The described efforts are complementary to the 
work undertaken by the Commission in support of the 
monitoring and 5-year assessment panels. An 
example of such work is outlined in Box 1 and deals 
with the definition of the constituting elements of 
European Added Value. 
Box 1. The constituting elements of European Added Value (EAV) 
Among the new selection criteria for the Fifth Framework Programme (FP5) is that related to the 
"European Added-Value" (EAV), a concept derived from the subsidiarity principle, that could be 
defined as the added value that could not be generated at national or regional level. In more practical 
terms, EAV relates to scientific and technological objectives to be pursued at European level and 
involves the development of critical mass, the contribution to the implementation of Community 
policies and to addressing European problems. 
The study envisaged here should look at the questions and issues relating to the identification of 
the EAV of the EU Research programmes. Its objective is, on the one hand, to address the problem 
from a global perspective by increasing knowledge and understanding of the constituent elements of 
EAV and their measurability and, on the other hand to illustrate by a case study the capacity of 
European RTD policy to fulfil its purpose regarding general EU socio-economic objectives. 
One of the main purposes of the study will then be to provide an operational notion of EAV that could 
be applied, in different areas of European research, systematically and consistently at the various levels 
of: policy development, programme definition, project selection, implementation and follow-up. 
The need for a better understanding of these questions is moreover increased with the adoption of 
FP5. Clear orientation towards a socio-economic problem-solving approach has been accepted. The 
objectives and criteria to be used for projects selection and evaluation have stronger socio-economic 
components than in the past, which results notably in the need to adapt'accordingly the programme's 
monitoring and assessment. There is therefore a clear need for improved evaluation tools, in order to 
demonstrate impact, take corrective actions where necessary and improve the design of future 
programmes. These requirements would be supported by the better understanding of EAV, as 
perceived by the different actors/stakeholders that the study will provide. Among the principal 
questions for the study to address are: 
A) What are the elements constituting the Framework Programme's EAV? All relevant aspects 
should be explored here and each element identified shall be illustrated by an example. How can the 
elements constituting the EAV of the Framework Programme be enumerated and defined in respect of 
its different components including: 
• Scientific and Technological Excellence: The importance of critical mass, building of European 
scientific community, internationalization of science, emphasis on collaborative research, 
importance of researchers' mobility. 
In enumerating the 
ways in which the FP 
generates EAV, the 
study should also 
describe the factors 
defining the limits to 
what it can achieve in 
each of the above 
areas (for example, 
shared responsibility 
with Member States 
in the regulatory 
environment, 
problems inherent to 
programme design, 
misspecification 
of objectives) 
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• Economic benefits: to what extent has the Framework Programme contributed via innovation to gains 
in competitiveness and the exploitation of the potential of the Internal Market, generated direct and 
indirect economic benefits and facilitated the establishment of European norms and standards? 
• Regulatory effects: to what degree has the Framework Programme contributed to the establishment 
of the European institutional and regulatory framework? 
• Networking Effects: How has the Framework Programme contributed to the establishment of 
networks for the dissemination of S&T knowledge, for example particularly in the area of 
industry/university collaboration. 
• Social Objectives: How has the Framework Programme contributed to the achievement of EU social 
objectives (environment, health, education and training, employment, social and economic 
cohesion etc.) 
B) What is the importance of these constituting elements: 
• for all the different stakeholders (projects participants, EU institutions, Member States' government 
and public administrations, industry, citizens' groups, NGOs)? 
• in addressing the socio-economic problems that the FP, as an instrument, is designed to tackle? 
C) What are the indicators/methodologies which can be used for their qualitative and whenever 
possible quantitative measurement?" 
D) How should these indicators/methodologies be best used to enhance the assessment of FP4 and 
FP5 EAV? 
The case study concentrate on one of the following socioeconomic themes: 
• improving health of European citizens. 
• transportation of population (increased mobility) and goods in the European Union 
Based on the analysis of the EAV performed in the generic part, the case study will quantify and 
qualify the added value of the FP (previous FPs and in particular FP3 and FP4) as regards the selected 
socio-economic themes. The mobility of people and therefore their transportation within the EU 
constitutes together with the transportation of goods is a very important factor of social and economic 
development and for the preservation of the environment. It involves a huge variety of actors (regulatory 
bodies, policy makers, many industrial and service sectors, representatives of citizens and consumers' 
interest, other NGOs, scientific community, research organization,...). Even more numerous are the 
actors concerned by the improvement of health standards which certainly is key for all citizens and 
encompasses problems that can greatly benefit from a pulling of the resources at the European level. 
Source: Liam O'Sullivan and Yves Dumont. Evaluation Unit, DC Research. 
Notes 
1- This work is the product of a team effort by the Evaluation Unit of DG Research, including Liam 
O'Sullivan, Yves Dumont, Luc Durieux, and Helga Teuber. 
2- CREST is a body composed of Member States representatives advising the Commission and the 
Council of Ministers on S&T issues. 
3- The members of the Network are evaluation experts from the national authorities (Ministries, 
Institutes, Research organizations) from the EU Member States, Norway and Israel. 
Contact 
Gilbert Fayl, Evaluation Unit, DG Research 
Tel.: +32 2 295 77 00, fax: +32 2 295 620 06, e-mail: Gilbert.Fayl@DG12.cec.be 
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Public Research Programmes: 
Socio-economic impact Assessment 
and User Needs 
Rémi Barré, OST and CNAM 
issue: A major objective of evaluations of recent technology and development 
programmes Is to assess their Impact. However, a narrow focus on Impact measurement 
and evaluations creates a risk of losing credibility and relevance for policy-makers. 
Relevance: To meet the undeniable need to evaluate the socio-economic Impact, 
evaluation may need to be considered In a broader sense, as a learning process, linking 
researchers and clients, aimed at building strategic intelligence Into the system through 
experimentation and debate. 
introduction: measuring impacts 
T he Fifth Framework Programme (FP5) for Research and Technology Development has explicit socio-economic objectives. It aims to create jobs, promote health and 
quality of life and preserve the environment 
through a problem-solving approach. Thus FP5 
has in some way to be driven by the needs of 
society. The recent report "Options and Limits for 
Assessing the Socio-Economie Impact of European 
RTD Programmes" rightly suggests that FP5 should 
be looked upon as a "social contract" between the 
research community and European citizens. 
Since the role of evaluation is to bring 
transparency, accountability and legitimacy, it has 
to reflect the nature of the research policy 
objectives. In the case of FP5, for which an 
ambitious set of socio-economic targets have been 
set, it is clear that the evaluation scope will have to 
be as broad as the reality of the EU research policy. 
It will have to address questions about the 
contribution of research to the socio-economic 
objectives of European society. In other words, if 
European RTD policy is to be accountable to 
European society, the evaluation of FP5 must 
directly address the question of how to assess its 
socio-economic impacts (Dumont et al., 1998). 
The obvious first step in assessing something is 
to measure it. Thus, by giving it the task of 
measuring impacts, the mandate of evaluation has 
been immediately transformed into one of impact 
measurement. But do we know how to measure 
such socio-economic impacts in any reasonable 
and credible way? 
Evaluation is faced here with the daunting 
task of measuring the wide variety of impacts 
5 w 
The objectives of FP5 
demand evaluation 
be included so as 
to assess its socio-
economic impacts 
There is no satisfactory 
way to measure 
impacts, in the 
narrow sense of the 
word, and evaluations 
are in danger of 
losing credibility and 
relevance for users 
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impact measurement 
entails measuring the 
difference between 
what happened after 
the research was 
completed and what 
would have happened 
had it not been 
carried out 
The non-linear process 
by which innovations 
develop makes it 
technically impossible 
to obtain an explicit 
conceptual model of 
the phenomenon 
relevant to the objectives of FP5, be they 
economic or social, direct or indirect, short term 
or long term, tangible or related to knowledge 
and skills effects. In the report mentioned above, 
the ad-hoc group of experts set up to review 
the issue suggests a number of techniques, 
always strongly stressing their limitations, finally 
stating, with a certain degree of understatement, 
that impact measurement represents a "new 
conceptual challenge". This is reflected by the 
evaluation reports which have tried to address 
the question of socio-economic assessment, and 
which have all ended up presenting a solemn 
disclaimer regarding their ability to deal with 
this point. There is a broad consensus in the 
academic community working on these ques-
tions that we face here one of the most 
methodologically intractable areas of evaluation. 
Thus easy promises necessarily give way to a 
defensive attitude stressing the lack of relevant 
data and lamenting the limits of the available 
methodologies. 
We would argue that our knowledge of the 
relationships between research activities and 
society is not up to the task of socio-economic 
impact assessment through some kind of 
measurement. 
A preliminary point is to realize that 
to measure the impact of research is to 
measure the difference between what has 
happened after the research has been done 
and what would have happened if it had not 
been done, everything else being equal. This 
means that to measure an impact, we need to 
model the system so as to be able to simulate 
the state of the system if the research in question 
had not been done, and then to compare it 
with the actual situation. Our argument is 
that there are insurmountable technical and 
epistemologica! obstacles to ever building such 
a model. 
The technical gap in socio-economic 
Impacts measurement 
The first of these obstacles is the technical 
impossibility of arriving at an explicit conceptual 
model of innovation. It is widely recognized that 
innovations do not develop according to a linear 
model going from basic research to use in society. 
More appropriate descriptions are the network 
model, the "chained linked" model or even the 
turbulence model, —an ¡mage highlighting the 
fundamentally random nature of the process. 
Furthermore, we also know that the effects of 
knowledge are largely based on intangibles such 
as network building, skills and know-how increase 
impacting on anticipations and strategies. 
Complex systems of intangibles are hardly 
appropriate elements for modelling. 
In other words, if efficiency is the ratio of outputs 
to inputs, how do you measure the efficiency of an 
input when it is one among many which you do not 
control, and when there are a multitude of non-
commensurate outputs, some of which are 
intangibles? This is the question of attribution (what 
part of the modification of an output parameter can 
be attributed to research?) and "additionality" (what 
difference does it make?). Other aspects are the 
portfolio effect (the project analysed is to be 
considered as one in a portfolio), the problems of 
irreversibility and non-replicability (Guy, 1998, 
Cameron, 1998). The research - innovation system 
is no less complex than other well-known complex 
systems, such as the weather system, in which a 
proverbial butterfly flapping its wings in one place 
could trigger a series of events leading to changes in 
the weather in another part of the world. 
The epistemologica! gap in socio-
economic impact measurement 
The second obstacle is what we might call an 
epistemologica! gap. There is a long chain of 
© IPTS - JRC - Seville, 1999 
N O . 4 O D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 9 T h e I P T S R e p o r t 
events linking analytical knowledge produced by 
research in the laboratory, to synthetic knowledge 
(as represented by capabilities and expertise), and 
finally to decision and action. Obviously, the 
socio­economic impacts of research derive from 
action, which means that measuring these 
impacts demands a model of the whole chain. 
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that this 
chain is influenced by the democratic process, 
and is in no way reducible to mechanistic or 
stochastic cause­and­effect relationships. 
Another way to put it is to observe that the 
impact measurement approach implies a research 
mode which is disconnected from the actions and 
strategies of the actors in the social and economic 
arenas. It assumes there is some sort of temporal 
sequence in which research is defined, then done, 
then its results are injected into "society", which in 
turn reacts and exhibits "impacts". This model is not 
only flawed, but, basically, it runs counter to the 
aims of FP5. FP5, on the contrary, is at the forefront 
of the "new mode" of research (Gibbons et al., 
1996), in which research takes place in a context of 
application (problem solving), including therefore a 
variety of actors with differing aims and strategies, 
but interacting in networks of suppliers and users. 
In such a context, the research process itself is 
embedded in society. There is no "impact" of 
research as such but a multi­actor dynamic 
involving knowledge creation, circulation and 
diffusion. 
The risk of denying these realities is that 
evaluation will try futilely to address directly the 
unrealistic measurement challenge, seeing it as the 
only legitimate way to approach the impact 
assessment issue. If such impact measurement 
stricto sensu cannot be done in a meaningful and 
satisfactory way for technical and epistemologica! 
reasons, then all attempts will necessarily fail. As a 
consequence, the clients of evaluation —decision­
makers and stakeholders— will feel they are not 
being served adequately, and evaluation could 
lose credibility and relevance. The paradox is that 
in trying to get closer to its users' interests by 
promising socio­economic impact measurements, 
evaluation is in fact placing itself in a position in 
which it could be creating false expectations and 
may even end up misleading those very users. The 
cause of this paradox is that there is a 
contradiction between the logic of impact 
measurement and the logic of the new mode of 
research exemplified by FP5. 
How, then, can we reconcile the concept of 
impact assessment, and the reality of the new 
mode of research, of which FP5 is paradigmatic? 
We suggest it can be done by taking the problem 
the other way around, and first addressing the 
expectations of the client regarding evaluation in 
this new mode of research. Only then will we 
examine the question of handling socio­economic 
impact assessment. 
The basic hypothesis is that evaluation can 
make sense to users ­ decision­makers and 
stakeholders ­ only if it helps them to play their 
legitimate role in the knowledge production, 
circulation and distribution process. In this sense, 
the fundamental aim of evaluation is to contribute 
to building a space in the research process for 
those actors. From this viewpoint, evaluation is 
one aspect of the research process, of a reflexive 
nature, having the peculiarity of involving new 
and different actors, where questions are re­
shaped, outcomes linked to new issues and 
adjustments negotiated. Evaluation retains its 
classical goals of fostering accountability and 
legitimization of the research process. It also 
addresses those accountable for the actions taken 
and deals with the capacity to adjust the strategy. 
But in the new mode of research, evaluation is not 
an external ex­post and ex­cathedra activity; it is 
part of the social process of research and 
innovation. Evaluation, in a sense, consists in 
% % ' ■ ■ ' 
Impact measurement is 
based on the 
underlying assumption 
that there is a temporal 
sequence in which 
research is defined, 
then done, then its 
results are injected into 
"society", which in turn 
reacts and exhibits 
"impacts" 
A re­appraisal of the 
role of evaluation in 
the research mode of 
FP5 is needed in order 
to reconcile the socio­
economic impact 
issues with policy­
makers' expectations 
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Dealing with impacts 
in a way that 
focuses narrowly on 
measurement implies 
an understanding of 
evaluation which is at 
odds with the new 
mode of research 
in the new mode of 
research, socio-
economic impact 
assessment is the 
learning process 
bringing together a 
broad set of actors 
jointly involved in the 
production - circulation 
- distribution of 
knowledge 
If research is put 
forward as the solution 
to social problems, 
then it becomes the 
property of a new set 
of stakeholders, and 
the public debates it 
generates are an 
important part of 
its evaluation 
building bridges between a broad set of actors, 
encompassing what is usually labelled science 
and society (Latour 1999). 
Dealing with impacts in a way that focuses 
narrowly on measurement originates in an 
understanding of evaluation which is at odds with 
the new mode of research. To serve adequately 
the needs of the clients of evaluation, we must 
consider a different, broader, perspective for 
evaluation, consistent with the philosophy of FP5. 
In this context, the impact measurement 
mandate is to be rejected. But what does the 
assessment of socio-economic impacts become? 
What is its functional equivalent in the evaluation 
scheme we propose? 
What is useful for users and central to the 
evaluation process is first to make explicit the 
interactions in the system built by the research 
project actors. This means identifying, in a 
qualitative way, the channels through which 
embodied and disembodied, codified and tacit 
knowledge circulate from various origins to 
various destinations. The research activity under 
examination is here viewed as one of the engines 
of knowledge creation, combination and 
distribution in this particular set of actors. We 
would suggest that one particularly relevant kind 
of interaction to trace concerns the links between 
research and policy-making at European or 
national levels. Such policy-making needs 
expertise, an adequate basis for regulations, and 
preparation of collective infrastructure —all of 
which are aspects which can be traced to research 
activities. This scheme could also provide a 
common language for use by researchers, 
evaluators and policy-makers. 
A second task, central to evaluation and to users 
is related to analytical and descriptive work 
regarding the programme in question. One 
important aspect of such analytical work is the 
process of constructing the indicators, which 
demands the usually implicit questions regarding 
the underlying conceptual model of research and 
innovation be made explicit, together with the 
relevant classifications or the boundaries of the 
dynamics to be considered. The other valuable 
aspect of analytical work is the criticism and debate 
it arouses. From technical points, one gets quickly 
to key issues which would have hardly been 
addressed otherwise. Even if the technical 
objectives are modest, their potential for collective 
learning is usually high, since the figures produced 
can be a useful focus for debate. A wide variety of 
such analytical work can be undertaken, referring 
to different methodologies, from surveys to 
bibliometrics, to economic and statistical analysis, 
including the gathering of expert opinions in 
quantifiable form. This task is evidence of the fact 
that we are not in any sense against quantification. 
We simply consider it to be a part of a much larger 
process, and a way of providing new insights and 
hypotheses rather than single numerical answers. 
A third task is directly related to interaction 
and debate among the actors involved (ETAN 
Expert Working Group, 1999). If research is put 
forward as the solution to social problems, then it 
becomes the property of a new set of stakeholders 
(Georghiou, 1999) and an important aspect of 
evaluation is the debates the interested public is 
likely to have based on its results. The aim here is 
to understand ways in which actors make sense of 
their involvement in the projects, as producers or 
users, and how their capabilities and strategies 
may be affected now and in the future. This is 
where the linkage with foresight and technology 
assessment comes in (See the article by S. 
Kuhlmann in this issue). Strategic debating, 
opening up of alternatives, maintaining a diversity 
of options are the key features of this task. The 
precautionary principle is also relevant here, 
since it provides a means whereby untested 
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hypotheses can be fed into the public debate and 
the process by which action is legitimated. The 
idea is to build intelligence into the system 
through experimentation and debate about 
implications of new knowledge gained through 
the research activities. 
Conclusion 
Socio­economic impact assessment consisting 
of the three above­mentioned tasks, can be best 
described as a process of learning and 
experimentation aiming at building the extended 
networks which constitute the social systems of 
innovation. In such systems, scientific knowledge 
does not close the debates, but contributes to it, 
and, in turn, the debates open new avenues for 
research itself. Thanks to such socio­economic 
impact assessment, evaluations can relate 
scientific activity and the political debate, thus 
adequately serving its users, be they decision­
makers, stakeholders or researchers. _^F 
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Additionality means 
the difference which 
government­sponsored 
programmes have 
made to the recipients, 
particularly companies, 
in terms of R&D 
activities 
Additionality of Publicly­Funded 
RTD Programmes 
Terttu Luukkonen, VTT Croup for Technology Studies 
issue: In recent years, the concept of additionality has provided a general framework for 
evaluating the role of publicly funded programmes in advancing the technological 
capabilities and options of firms. However, this concept is based on simplified 
assumptions about the role of public programmes and it Is not sufficient to reveal the 
usefulness of public technology support. 
Relevance: The question of "additionality" Is related to the basic rationale for public 
intervention in the technological development of companies. It is relevant for 
understanding both the potential and the limitations of public action. Since the concept 
Is an important evaluation tool, a reassessment of current assumptions underlying it will 
help Improve evaluation practices. 
introduction 
In recent years, both at the national and European level, additionality has provided an important concept for evaluating the role of publicly funded RTD programmes in advan­
cing the technological capabilities of firms. In 
short, additionality means the difference which 
government­sponsored programmes have made to 
the recipients, particularly companies, in terms of 
R&D activities. This concept evolved into an 
evaluation framework in the UK in the early 80s, 
where it was originally used as a justification for 
public support to technology development in 
companies. With the help of the concept of 
additionality, it could be claimed that public funds 
did not directly substitute for corporate investment 
in R&D, but were somehow additional to that 
which would have happened anyway (Buisseret et 
al., 1995). The UK Alvey programme evaluation 
(1984­1990), which developed and refined many 
evaluation tools used later on in evaluation in 
other countries and at the EU level, used the 
additionality approach (Quintas & Guy, 1995). 
The concept was further elaborated within the EC 
MONITOR­SPEAR programme studies in the late 
80s (Georghiou, 1994). 
The current use of additionality in evaluation 
does not adequately assess the role of public 
programmes in advancing the technological 
options of firms. If applied rigorously, it may lead 
to short­termism in policies. This article will 
explore several types of situations in which public 
funding is supposed to have failed. Attention has 
previously been drawn to public funding subs­
tituting corporate investment in R&D and to trivial 
R&D carried out for the sake of availability of 
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public funding. I will present a typology of 
situations for public support, supposedly 
successful and unsuccessful, and discuss the 
relevance of the concept of additionality in this 
context. In order to illustrate the discussion, I will 
draw on three studies of Finnish firms in EU frame­
work programmes (Luukkonen and Niskanen, 
1998; Luukkonen, 1999; and an unpublished 
study of Finnish participation in the Fourth 
Framework Programrne). 
The concept of additionality 
The concept of additionality rests originally on 
the neo­classical market failure rationale, i.e. the 
notion that, left to themselves, firms will under­
invest in innovative activities because of their 
inability to appropriate all the benefits arising from 
them (Nelson 1959, Arrow 1962, Dasgupta and 
David 1994). Additionality is expected to gauge the 
difference between the presumed under­investment 
in RTD by firms and the actual joint investment by 
firms and public agencies in RTD prompted by the 
public programmes. With regard to collaborative 
R&D programmes, of which the EU framework 
programmes are a prime example, market failure 
does not relate to the production of R&D perse, but 
to the transfer and flow of information between 
firms or firms and public­sector research institutes. 
The costs of transferring and exploiting scientific 
and technological knowledge are so high that they 
affect the success or failure with which such 
knowledge can be utilized (Mowery 1983; Mowery 
1994). This will make it necessary to launch policy 
initiatives which involve more than simply 
subsidizing the creation of scientific/technological 
knowledge, especially promoting the transfer of 
knowledge through networking and collaborative 
R&D programmes. 
In evaluation, the additionality criteria would 
apply, in principle, to all possible impacts of a 
government initiative with subsequent difficulties 
in measurement, for instance, the attribution of 
effects of a funding which has a short duration 
(Buisseret et al., 1995). In evaluation practice, 
however, additionality has become one 
dimension among many others, such as impact, 
effectiveness and efficiency (Guy and Arnold, 
1993). This blurs the fact that, basically, all the 
various effects of an initiative constitute the 
"additional" gains it has brought about. 
Government failures 
In the economic literature, attention has been 
drawn to the desirability of avoiding a substitution 
of corporate investments in R&D by public money 
(e.g. Metcalfe 1995). Some attention has also 
been paid to another potential problem, that of 
trivial R&D. For example, Quintas and Guy 
(1995) identified the possibility of trivial 
collaboration in the evaluation of the large UK 
"Alvey" programme: the "additionality" criterion 
which was built­in to the Alvey programme 
suggests "that Alvey R&D was non­essential for 
firms' overall business and technology strategies; 
otherwise they would fund the R&D themselves" 
(p. 331). Examples are also cited showing that 
pubi ic authorities may, in the case of international 
programmes such as EU framework programmes, 
press companies to participate ­ in order to get a 
"juste retour" (Luukkonen, 1999). The lever may 
be the possibility'of obtaining national public 
funds in the future. This will easily lead to 
participation, which is trivial from the company's 
point of view. The possibility of substitution and 
trivial R&D highlight the fact that there may be 
governmental failures in the launching and 
implementation of public R&D programmes. 
The following section will illustrate these 
possibilities by examining different combinations 
of additionality and strategic value of R&D carried 
out with public support. The discussion considers 
the viewpoint of the company obtaining public 
■a Q. 
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If a company has 
"strategic blind spots", 
i.e. it fails to foresee 
important potential 
future needs and 
opportunities, R&D 
related to such options 
would appear as 
trivial R&D from 
the viewpoint of 
the company 
Table 1. Additionality vs. strategic value 
Strategic value 
High 
Low 
Additionality 
Ideal 
Trivial 
support, since it is the only systematic information 
available and is usually used in evaluation. Still, it 
is important to recognize that public programmes 
are launched after a judgement by the public 
decision-makers of the strategic economic or social 
value of a given technology area for future options. 
For illustrative purposes, the two dimensions 
to be considered, strategic value and degree of 
additionality, have been dichotomized. A cross-
tabulation of additionality and strategic 
importance leads to the following fourfold table 
(Table 1), in which I have classified the different 
categories according to their policy expectations: 
"Substitution" (category 2) is defined as 
strategically important R&D which the firm would 
have done in any case, but when government 
money was available, it utilized it. Category 3, 
"trivial" R&D, is defined as non-essential R&D 
which companies would not have done if 
government funding had not been available, as 
referred to above (Quintas and Guy, 1995). 
By contrast, the first category, termed "ideal", 
is strategically important R&D which would not 
have been carried out without government 
funding for various reasons (uncertainty, risks, 
expenses, insufficient appropriability etc.). In an 
ideal case, a government programme has high 
additionality in advancing strategically important 
endeavours. If a company has "strategic blind 
spots", i.e. it fails to foresee important potential 
future needs and opportunities, R&D related to 
such options would represent trivial R&D from the 
viewpoint of the company. From a well-informed 
Substitution 
Marginal 
policy-makers' viewpoint, it would represent 
strategically important R&D. In reality, however, 
bounded rationality hampers the decision-making 
of both companies and public agencies. 
Category 4 denotes "marginal" R&D, non­
essential, unimportant R&D which would have 
been carried out anyway, perhaps to search for new 
potential avenues for technology development. It is 
conceivable that it is exploratory research that a 
company, with EU funds and an EU consortium 
available, was able to carry out within a broader 
network and with broader expertise. 
Empirical cases 
The above classification was applied to data 
from an exploratory study of the strategies of large 
Finnish firms and their EU RTD collaboration at 
the outset of the Fourth Framework Programme 
(Luukkonen, 1999). Some preliminary findings 
from a similar, ongoing study at the outset of the 
Fifth Framework Programme are also used. The 
paper also draws on unpublished survey data on 
Finnish firms in the Fourth Framework Programme. 
In Table 2, the EU RTD collaboration strategies 
of the interviewed set of companies have been 
classified using the categories in Table 1. 
The first important observation is that the ideal 
category contains fewer cases than expected. This 
is. because, especially for large firms, publicly-
funded collaborative RTD programmes are most 
appropriate for the funding of longer-term and 
exploratory research tasks which benefit from the 
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Table 2. 
_ 
Companies in different Industries and additionality of EU projects 
, Strategit \.imi' 
High 
Low 
Additionality 
High 
Ideal 
Telecommunications projects; 
a machinery company and 
a few other projects 
Trivial 
Pharmaceuticals, forestry, 
metals and machinery companies; 
some telecommunications projects 
Low 
Substitution 
Telecommunications projects 
Marginal 
Early participation 
expertise of a larger group. Firms are normally 
reluctant to bring their strategically important 
projects to collaborative consortia, in which they 
cannot fully control the flow of information 
(Luukkonen, 1999). They wish to fund their 
strategic projects themselves. 
There are, however, exceptions. As Table 2 
indicates, these exceptions are particularly from the 
area of telecommunications (Luukkonen, 1999). In 
this field, European companies that are each others' 
direct competitors have come together in their joint 
interest to develop standards, hopefully to be 
adopted worldwide. In the telecommunications 
business, competition is extremely tough, and in 
some areas, this has been translated into 
competition between different standards. EU 
programmes have enabled background research 
into the creation of new standards and provided 
forums for creating joint European views. Some of 
the projects funded represent "ideal" cases in Table 
1 and 2, others represent "substitution" cases. 
Besides formal standardisation organizations such 
as the European ETSI (The European Telecommu-
nications Standards Institute), new informal forums 
have emerged for negotiations about standards. 
European projects have provided such ad hoc 
forums. Since many EU projects in this field have 
provided additional negotiation forums, in Table 2, 
a majority of telecommunications projects have 
been classified as "substitution". Still, the 
classification as "substitution" does not fully reveal 
the usefulness of such projects. European projects 
have enabled background research drawing on 
much broader expertise than would otherwise have 
been possible. EU funding has also given such 
projects political credibility and support and thus 
helped European firms in their global negotiations. 
Telecommunications firms also had projects in 
the "trivial" category. This is the category with most 
cases in various industries. As mentioned above, 
publicly funded collaborative RTD programmes 
seem best suited to longer-term and uncertain 
projects providing the firms with a broader 
knowledge.base and thus expanding the depth and 
often the speed of the project. Such projects are not 
yet classified as strategically important, since their 
outcomes are uncertain. Thus projects termed 
trivial may turn out to be far from trivial, especially 
if looked at in the longer-term. We need to make a 
distinction between "truly trivial" cases, referred to 
above, and those that seem to be trivial for their 
long-term and uncertain nature. 
The "marginal" category is interesting. Very few 
interviewed technology and R&D directors of 
companies reported participation which could be 
classified as "marginal". By contrast, according to 
a survey with participants in the fourth framework 
programme, research scientists reported fairly large 
groups of "marginal" cases (24 % in SMEs and 39% 
13 
% 
In some areas, 
particularly 
telecommunications, 
EU programmes have 
brought competitors 
together and enabled 
work towards 
common standards 
©IPTS-JRC -Seville. 1999 
T h e I P T S R e p o r t N o . 4 0 D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 9 
14 
f Jr J4 t* iJ 
Participant companies 
regarded EU 
programmes as 
useful and strategically 
important because 
they provided 
intangible goods 
such as a forum for 
standards discussions 
among European 
competitors 
in large companies; unpublished data). The 
difference may result partly from the different 
perspectives of senior management and research 
personnel, with the former group emphasizing 
greater selection in the company's RTD projects 
in general and consequent greater importance of 
all projects. 
The description above is based on data from 
large companies. The situation is somewhat 
different for SMEs. Available survey data indicate 
that for SMEs, EU RTD programmes play an "ideal" 
role more often than for large companies. SMEs 
cannot usually afford long-term R&D, and their 
EU projects are often shorter-term, and of greater 
strategic importance (Luukkonen, 1999). 
Discussion 
As to the interpretation of the typology of public 
support, presented above, it is true for the sample 
examined that the telecommunications firms in 
many cases replaced private money with public 
money to carry out R&D activities they would have 
done anyway. However, these companies regarded 
EU programmes as useful and strategically 
important because they provided intangible goods: 
they provided an additional forum for standards 
discussions among European competitors and 
facilitated contacts. European firms have been 
successful in worldwide competition over tele-
communications standards. This cannot be 
regarded as a result of EU collaboration, though 
the latter has been a facilitator especially since EU 
collaboration has been perceived to provide 
political support to the technical solutions 
recommended. Thus EU collaboration played an 
important role in the development of the third 
generation of mobile phone communication 
standards. 
With regard to the industries that participated 
in "trivial" projects, their unimportance was partly 
related to their long-term nature. These also 
involved new complementary technologies and 
new partner links that had previously been quite 
weak. There was considerable uncertainty as to 
the outcome, especially as to the commercial 
importance of the projects. Such "trivial" projects 
may in the end turn out to be strategically 
important. The trivial class also included projects 
which were capability building and furthered 
general knowledge acquisition. However, it is to 
be remembered that there may also be "truly" 
trivial projects, as referred to above. 
The "marginal" category in the survey data is 
more difficult to interpret. Companies carried out 
R&D activities that they might have undertaken 
anyway, and not only in their core areas. It may be 
a question of long-term R&D activity, the value of 
which is still uncertain, but which the company 
undertakes with public money, since it is available. 
The above findings highlight that a simple 
concept like additionality and particularly its 
routine application in surveys, is not sufficient to 
reveal the usefulness of public technology support. 
The examples of the "trivial" and "substitution" 
categories highlight this aspect. At first sight, even 
they appeared to be unwanted cases of public 
support, but especially the so-called "trivial" 
category cases may turn out to be successful in the 
long run. These are often capability building 
projects, which may open up potential new areas 
of economic exploitation in the future. The "ideal" 
case of support, that of high additionality and high 
strategic value, may be ideal when considered in 
the short-term since it is based on the present-day 
assessment of what is strategically important. 
Public technology support may have most 
potential in promoting longer-term activities and 
longer-term additionality, which is difficult to 
evaluate in the present day. If we put too much 
emphasis on additionality termed "¡deal", as 
defined above, we end up with short-termism in 
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our policies. Because of the long-term nature of 
technology development, its impact is inherently 
uncertain and we are left with uncertain 
conclusions as to its value (see Metcalfe, 1995). 
We may evaluate the successes and failures of 
policies only in the very long-term, maybe 10-15 
years after their implementation. This is awkward 
for policy-makers who are called upon to prove 
the appropriateness and efficiency of their policies 
today. The lesson of the foregoing discussion is 
also that, in the evaluation of EU projects, we need 
to use different methods and sources of data. 
Routine surveys do not reveal the full importance 
of EU collaboration. W 
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Over the past decade, 
the issue focus of 
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Distributed intelligence: 
Combining Evaluation. Foresight 
and Technology Assessment 
Stefan Kuhlmann, ISI 
issue: Evaluation, together with foresight and technology assessment, can be used with 
different combinations to enhance strategic inputs to policymaking. These combinations 
can help provide Input to European policymaking through a flexible "bottom-up" 
architecture linking multiple sources of RTD-related expertise. 
Relevance: If the data and information resulting from the evaluation of public policies 
and programmes are used as an Input to the planning of future policy initiatives - and 
not only as an ex post legitimization - then evaluation might function as an "intelligence 
tool: Furthermore, If evaluation efforts, are also combined with other Intelligence tools 
like science and technology foresight or technology assessment initiatives, a 'tool box" 
of strategic intelligence for policymaking could even emerge. 
Introduction 
T here have been many changes and developments in the theory and practice of the evaluation of public Research, Technology, Development and Innovation 
(RTDI) policies over the past decade. In particular, 
in countries where evaluation has taken root fairly 
early, the following trends can be observed: 
• the major rationale for evaluations has shifted 
and evolved from a desire to legitimate past 
actions and demonstrate accountability, to the 
need to improve understanding and inform 
future actions; 
• correspondingly, the issue focus of evaluations 
has broadened away from a narrow focus on 
quality, economy, efficiency and effectiveness, 
and towards a more all-embracing concern with 
additional issues, such as the appropriateness of 
past actions and a concern with performance 
improvement and strategy development; 
approaches to evaluation have evolved away 
from a purist model of "objective neutrality", 
characterized by independent evaluators 
producing evaluation outputs containing 
evidence and argument but no recommen-
dations; to more formative approaches in which 
evaluators act as process consultants in learning 
exercises involving all relevant stakeholders, 
providing advice and recommendations as well 
as independent analysis; 
this has led to more flexible and experimental 
approaches to the construction of policy 
portfolios, and to even greater demands for well 
specified systems of monitoring, evaluation and 
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benchmarking to aid analyses and feedback 
into strategy development. 
Many evaluations thus reflect an increasing 
concern with the link between evaluation and 
strategy, with an eclectic mix of methodologies 
used in the context of individual exercises to 
satisfy the demands for understanding and advice. 
Increasing attention is also being paid in many 
institutional settings to the way in which 
evaluation (EV) can inform strategy­ and quite 
often in combination with technology foresight 
(TF) or technology assessment (TA). 
The Need for improved Strategic 
intelligence 
Analysts in the field of RTDI policies have 
abandoned simplistic models of how innovation 
and innovation processes work. It is increasingly 
recognized that the dynamics of "innovation 
systems" ­l inking industries, research and 
education organizations, political institutions­ are 
complex and difficult to understand, and that 
scientific and technological communities, not to 
mention the "users" of their products, face a 
number of challenges: (1) The nature of 
technological innovation processes is changing. 
The manufacture of highly sophisticated products 
makes increased demands on the science base, 
necessitating interdisciplinary research and the 
fusion of heterogeneous technological trajectories. 
New patterns of communication and interaction 
are emerging which researchers, innovators and 
policy­makers have to recognize and 
comprehend. (2) European policy­makers have to 
coordinate their interventions with an increasing 
number of actors (e.g. European authorities; 
numerous national government departments and 
regional agencies; industrial enterprises and 
associations; trade unions and organized social 
movements etc.). (3) The growing cost of science 
and innovation is also likely to accelerate the 
international division of labour in the European 
research system, a development which wil l 
increase the need for a highly strategic, though not 
necessarily a centralized, European RTDI policy. 
Policy­formulation in these circumstances is 
not straightforward. There is increasing pressure 
on policy­makers to: 
• increase efficiency and effectiveness in the 
governance of science and technology; 
• make difficult choices in the allocation of 
scarce resources for the funding of science and 
technology; 
• help preside over the establishment of an 
international division of labour in science and 
technology acceptable to all actors involved; 
• integrate "classical" RTDI policy initiatives 
with broader socio­economic targets, such as 
reducing unemployment, fostering the social 
inclusion of less favoured societal groups and 
regions, as claimed in particular by the 5 m 
Framework Programme of the European 
Commission; 
• acknowledge, comprehend and master the 
increasing complexity of innovation systems 
(more actors, more aspects, more levels etc.); 
• adapt to .changes in the focus of RTDI policies 
between international (growing), national 
(declining) and regional (growing) levels. 
Over the last two decades, considerable efforts 
have been made to improve inputs into the design 
of effective science, technology and innovation 
policies. In particular, formalized methodologies 
have been introduced and developed which 
attempt to analyse past behaviour (EV), review 
technological options for the future (TF), and 
assess the implications of adopting particular 
options (TA). As a complement of EV, TF and TA, 
other intelligence tools such as comparative 
studies of the national, regional or sectoral 
"technological competitiveness", benchmarking 
methodologies etc. were also developed and used. 
17 
The changing nature 
of technology, ■ 
new patterns of 
communication and 
interaction and an 
increasing number of 
actors have provoked 
the need for a highly 
strategic, European 
RTDI policy 
©IPTS­JRC ­Seville, 1999 
T h e I P T S R e p o r t N o . 4 0 D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 9 
18 W 
ε s 
A? 
Over the last two 
decades new 
technofogies have 
been introduced and 
policy-makers at all 
levels have benefited 
from a greater 
involvement in 
the processes of 
Strategic Intelligence 
Policy-makers at regional, national and 
international levels have all benefited from 
involvement in these processes and exploited their 
results in the formulation of new policies. 
Analytically, one can identify a couple of structural 
factors boosting the function of Strategic 
Intelligence (SI): 
• a linear model of policymaking as a 
consequential process (in which the typical 
steps are: formulation, agenda setting, deci­
sions, implementation, evaluation, formulation 
etc.) is no longer appropriate, at least not in the 
field of innovation policies. Here, all typical 
sfeps are more or less interacting. The 
emergence of SI knowledge as a policy 
resource on the one hand, and structural and 
institutional preconditions of using intelligence 
activities on the other, influence and transform 
each other. Often, it is external pressure on 
policy actors and the related arenas that create 
the impulse for the production and application 
of advanced SI; 
RDTI policy is rather (and increasingly) a 
matter of networking between heterogeneous 
(organized) actors instead of top-down 
decision-making and implementation. Policy 
decisions frequently are negotiated in multi­
level/multi-actor arenas and related actor 
networks. Negotiating actors pursue different -
partly contradicting - interests, represent 
different stakeholders perspectives, construct 
different perceptions of "reality"' refer to 
diverging institutional "frames" (see figure 1 ). 
"Successful" policymaking normally means 
compromising through alignment and "re-
framing" of stakeholders' perspectives; 
contesting and negotiating actors use money, 
power and information as their main media. 
Various actors have different shares of these 
resources at their disposal. Strategic Intelligence 
tools (as EV, TF, TA) use in particular "informa­
tion" and knowledge as negotiation medium, 
facilitating a more "objective" formulation of 
Figure 1. Actors in RTDI Policy Arenas and Strategic Intelligence 
Strategic 
Intelligence 
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diverging perceptions of (even contentious) 
subjects, offering appropriate indicators and 
information-processing mechanisms. 
Increasingly, it has become obvious to both 
policy-makers and the analysts involved in the 
development and use of SI tools that there is 
scope for continuous improvement and a further 
need to exploit potential synergies. 
RTDI Policy Evaluation, Technology 
Foresight, Technology Assessment 
One can describe the basic concepts of EV, TF, 
and TA in the following way: 
• Practices of science, technology and innova-
tion policy evaluation are wide-ranging, and 
their functions vary significantly (1) from 
legitimizing for distribution of public money 
and the demonstrating the adequate and 
effective use of the funding by measuring the 
scientific/ technological quality or the (po-
tential) socio-economic impacts, via (2) 
improved management and "fine tuning" of 
S&T policy programmes, to (3) an attempt to 
improve transparency in the rules of the game 
and the profusion of research funding 
enhancing the information basis for shaping 
innovation policies, in the sense of a gover-
nment-led "mediation" between diverging and 
competing interests of various players within 
the innovation system (Kuhlmann, 1997). 
• "Technology foresight is the systematic attempt 
to look into the longer-term future of science, 
technology, the economy and society, with the 
aim of identifying the areas of strategic 
research and the emerging of generic 
technologies likely to yield the greatest 
economic and social benefits" (Martin, 1995)1. 
• Technology assessment: In very general terms, 
TA can be described as the anticipation of 
impacts and feedback in order to reduce the 
human and social costs of learning how to 
handle technology in society by trial and error. 
Behind this definition, a broad array of 
national traditions in TA is hidden (Schot, 
1997, Loveridge, 1996). 
General Requirements for Distributed 
intelligence 
A survey of existing practices and 
experiences with the integrated use of the three 
intelligence tools for innovation policymaking 
EV, TF, and TA in various European countries and 
the ELI Commission reveals that there is no 
"blueprint" of how the tools can be best 
combined (Airaghi, 1997; Guy, 1998; Fayl, 
1997). The configuration should be considered 
from case to case, depending on the objectives 
and scope of the policy decision-making process 
in question. We do not advocate integration 
per se, but an integration for those cases 
where a combination of information looking 
back in time, looking at current strengths 
and weaknesses, looking at a wide set of 
stakeholders and at future developments can 
improve the insights needed to choose between 
strategic options. 
In general, we could state that the greater the 
potential socio-economic impact of technology 
and innovation, the stronger the case is for using 
the full array of available techniques for strategic 
intelligence. 
A number of general principles of Distributed 
Intelligence for complex innovation systems can be 
put forward: 
• organize mediation processes and "discourses" 
between contesting actors in related policy 
arena; 
• inject policy in such discourses on the results of 
EV, TF, and TA, and also analyses of changing 
The basic concepts 
of the new 
methodologies, EV, 
TF and TA, correspond 
to policy evaluation, 
technology foresight 
and technology 
assessment 
The greater the 
potential socio-
economic impact of 
technology and 
innovation, the 
stronger the case is for 
using the full array of 
available techniques for 
strategic intelligence 
An important 
precondition of 
useful Strategic and 
Distributed Intelligence 
is the quality and 
reliability of the 
information provided 
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Due to the lack of 
linkages between 
individual exercises 
this has led to the 
underutilization of 
existing information, 
knowledge and 
capabilities in the pro-
cess of innovation 
policy formulation 
Better coordination, 
cooperation, task 
assignment and 
development of 
expertise of national 
institutions are 
requisites to guarantee 
an overall improvement 
in the functions of DI 
for RTDI policy 
innovation processes, the dynamics of changing 
research systems, changing functions of public 
policies; 
• there by realize the multiplicity of actor's values 
and interests; 
• facilitate a more "objective" formulation of 
diverging perceptions by offering appropriate 
indicators, analyses and information-processing 
mechanisms; 
• create forums for interaction, negotiation and 
the preparation of decisions; 
• respond to the political quest for democracy vis-
à-vis technological choices. 
Since RTDI policymaking occurs in multiple 
policy arenas on regional, national, European 
levels there is a need for "interfaces", linking 
different systems and related-policy arenas. Some 
general requirements of Improved Strategic 
Intelligence Infrastructures based on Distributed 
Intelligence (see Figure 2) are as follows: 
• the creation of an architecture of "infra-
structures" for Distributed Intelligence - but not 
one unique "system" - by the linking of existing 
regional, national, sectoral, etc. SI facilities, 
horizontally and vertically; 
• the establishment of brokering "nodes" managing 
and maintaining the infrastructure, offering an 
"enabling structure" allowing free access to all 
SI exercises undertaken under public auspices, 
and providing a "directory" facilitating direct 
connections between relevant actors; 
• the guarantee of robustness, including adequate 
resources. 
An important precondition of useful Strategic 
and Distributed Intelligence is the quality and 
reliability of the information provided. General 
requirements for related quality assurance 
mechanisms are: 
• the facilitation of repeated and "fresh" exercises 
(e.g. EV, TF, TA) and new combinations of actors 
and levels; 
• the enhancement and stabilization of 
professional quality of distributed SI production, 
including registration and accreditation of 
professional practitioners, and mechanisms to 
stimulate renewal. 
Enhancing Distributed Intelligence for 
RTDI Policymaking on the European level 
Current practices in most countries as well as 
at the EU level, however, have evolved in an 
uneven and independent fashion. Individual 
exercises have rarely been inter-linked either 
conceptually or politically. This lack of linkages 
has led to the underutilization of existing 
information, knowledge and capabilities in the 
process of innovation policy formulation. 
Consequently, this has become a major obstacle 
to attempts at coordinated policy design and 
practices. For instance, the task set up in the 
Maastricht Treaty to arrive at a coordinated 
European science, research and technology policy 
(including regional, national, and European 
levels) so far has not been fed by the systematic 
use of intelligence tools. 
In the future, European RTDI policies might 
put an increased emphasis on mission-orientation 
towards societal problems (while most diffusion-
oriented programmes would remain in the 
domain of the member states), a tendency 
that has already been emerging with the FP5. 
In the longer run, new initiatives, based on 
comprehensive considerations of needs and 
opportunities as well as impacts, could be 
launched to complement current generic 
programmes and other schemes. This would 
entail more horizontal activities, and hence 
different forms of organization of these activities -
e.g. using the model of "task forces". 
Given the set of existing institutions carrying 
out the functions of Distributed Intelligence for 
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Figure 2. Architecture of Distributed Strategic Intelligence (SI) 
European RTDI 
policy arena 
National RTDI 
policy arena A 
National RTDI 
policy arena D 
Regional RTDI 
policy arena Β 
innovation policy, there is room for considerable 
improvement in their functioning along the 
following principles: 
• better co­ordination of EV with TF and TA along 
the policy cycle within the Commission; the 
already implemented and quite ambitious 
"impact assessment" procedures provide a 
useful starting base. Furthermore, the role of the 
Research DG as a mediator between other parts 
of the Commission and national innovation 
policy actors could be strengthened; 
• better co­operation between the Commission 
and the European Parliament in general and in 
TA in particular. A stronger role for the 
Parliament, especially with regard to TA; 
• better assignment of tasks of the respective 
institutions, with the focus of EU institutions on 
information gathering, synthesising and 
preparation of policy decisions rather than 
carrying out the research tasks themselves; 
• the development and full use of the expertise of 
national institutions through commissioning, 
joint projects etc. is a necessary basis for any EU 
exercise in EV, TF and TA. Information exchange 
and regular mutual staff exchange between the 
different communities could be organized 
on the European level (e.g. in the form of 
(bi­) annual conferences like those recently 
organized by the Commission in the context of 
the European RTD Evaluation Network); 
• the development of interfaces between science 
and technology actors and the general public 
(e.g. as the Internet­based "Futur­Prozess", 
recently, launched in Germany extending the 
Foresight experiences of the 1990s). 
In such a world of distributed policy­making, a 
Strategic Intelligence architecture would facilitate 
governance of the changing conditions of 
innovation processes, the democratic choice of 
future technologies, and the limitation of public 
expenditure linked to decision­making processes. 
Distribution means leaning on bottom­up 
processes, while in order to be effective and 
trustworthy, standards of quality and quality 
assurance systems need to be developed. In 
addition, central networking nodes, which 
facilitate horizontal linkages and the circulation of 
knowledge between different policy arenas and 
levels, will be of crucial importance. _JP 
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In order to carry out 
effective policy­making, 
Strategic Intelligence 
plays a fundamental 
part. Additionally, 
standards of quality, 
the circulation of 
knowledge and 
centralized networking 
are all areas of 
uppermost importance 
that should not 
be ignored 
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Lessons f r o m RTDI Enhancement in 
Less­Favoured Regions 
Lena J . T s i p o u r i , University of Athens 
issue: The relationship between increasing R&D and real economic g rowth (as well as Its 
evaluation) is more complicated than a simple mathematical equation, and Is affected by 
the propensity to disseminate technology and the ability of economic actors to absorb 
knowledge. Dissemination and absorptive capabilities are a particular problem in less 
favoured regions, where behavioural patterns in the face of uncertainties differ f rom 
those In core regions. 
Relevance: More and more regional, national and transnational funds have been Invested 
In RTDI in the less favoured regions in the last decade. A combination of a set of 
quantitative indicators and qualitative assessments has been used In the evaluation of 
RTDI initiatives in the Objective 1 regions of the EU. The results offer a set of lessons both 
for the regions studied and to some extent help formulate proposals for the fu ture 
member states. 
introduction1 
T here is no doubt that technology contri­butes to international competitiveness and, as a consequence, to economic growth and development. All strands of 
economic thought (Romer 1990, Romer 1986, 
Grossman and Helpman 1991, Nelson 1993, Dosi 
1988, Edquist 1997) converge to this general 
conclusion, although they often disagree about or 
plead ignorance as to the precise mechanisms and 
means to apply in order to achieve these targets. 
Policy­makers in developed, less favoured and 
developing countries and regions worldwide are 
increasingly adopting strategies and measures that 
incorporate technology­support and endogenous 
development promotion in their agendas2, as 
prescribed by state­of­the­art theory. 
Unfortunately, there are no linear or other 
mathematical functions that determine the rate of 
return of R&D investments. Policy­makers can 
decide on research inputs and portfolios of 
finance but with some uncertainty regarding their 
results. Thus, although research and development 
(R&D) inputs are known to be a valuable input for 
growth and welfare, it is still to a large extent 
unexplored how exactly they relate to outputs like 
technology and innovation (T&l). RTDI, used as 
an interconnected acronym in the Community 
jargon, is by far not an entity, and, if policies are 
not adequately designed, one may very well end 
up by supporting only part of the process3. 
An additional problem to this lack of 
deterministic knowledge is that the limited 
evidence that exists is based on measurements and 
H 
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Although it has 
been proven that 
technology contributes 
to international 
competitiveness 
and, subsequently, 
to economic growth 
and development, 
its relation with R&D 
inputs and their 
combined effect on 
results remain very 
much unexplored 
©IPTS­JRC ­Seville. 1999 
T h e I P T S R e p o r t N o . 4 o D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 9 
24 
/ / 
Difficulty exists in 
transferring existing 
role-models to less 
favoured regions due 
to the limited, biased 
knowledge available 
and the existing 
technical and human 
resources and policies 
of the region 
in question 
Results, backed by the 
belief of European 
policy-makers that the 
learning society is the 
only sustainable growth 
model for Europe, 
show that R&D inputs 
have grown rapidly 
experiences of technologically -advanced 
countries and therefore takes core regions' 
structures for granted. Thus, enlightened policy-
makers intervening to help less favoured regions to 
become more competitive, with learning society 
rather than low-wage aspirations, are confronted 
with a very biased reservoir of knowledge on 
concrete actions. There is a tendency to launch 
measures that might prove unsuitable in a new 
environment. Cumulative effects, the internal 
dynamics of spillovers and external economies in 
every region, path dependencies, public and 
private sector rigidities or inefficiencies and 
limited degrees of freedom are behind this 
difficulty of transferring successful models. 
The effort to draw conclusions from the core 
regions experiences starts with a high number of 
limitations and problem areas: companies in less 
favoured countries or regions (LFRs)4 are too small 
and too traditional to take investment decisions in 
RTDI or facilitate appropriaci i ty. Thus, the most 
important areas are effective support to increase 
spillovers and create externalities under the 
limited degrees of freedom allowed by path 
dependencies. In the same context, changes in the 
propensity to network are relevant aspects of 
policy that will lead to benefits of trust and 
externalities. Human resources are, finally, also a 
key issue for technology development and 
competitive performance on many levels and 
from two points of view. Skills are necessary to 
improve technological capabilities but by the 
same token, only skilled employees can cope with 
technological change and thus employment will 
only increase if an economy disposes of 
employees able to respond to technological 
needs. Yet, these two key areas, which appear to 
be the most relevant, seem also to make the 
difference between core regions and LFRs. In the 
former, externalities are automatically created due 
to long-term patterns of co-operation and 
mobility, while in the latter, dissemination is 
difficult due to limited absorptive capabilities and 
the overall structure of manufacturing and 
competition. 
Empirical evidence from RTDI emphasis 
in the EU Less -Favoured Regions 
RTDI investments in all Objective 1 regions of 
the EU have grown very rapidly from the first to the 
second Community Support Framework (CSF). 
Due to the firm belief of the European policy-
makers that the learning society is the only 
sustainable growth model for Europe, in the long-
run, the inputs for R&D have grown fast. In order 
of magnitude, Table 1 demonstrates that, in 
absolute terms, they grew 3- to 10-fold, while, in 
relative terms, they doubled. At the same time, the 
LFRs increased their participation in the 
Framework Programme5 (Sharp 1998) further 
increasing R&D financial resources. This evolution 
is fully compatible with recent OECD guidelines 
(OECD 1998, OECD 1999). 
Technology-induced improvements in 
productivity and employment were less visible 
than increased inputs. On the contrary, in some 
cases it is suggested that RTDI funds have not met 
their targets or have only partly done so (CEC 
1997, CEC 1999). At any rate contribution to 
competitiveness and economic growth has 
differed considerably. Funds have flown to a large 
extent towards the creation of R&D infrastructure 
during the first CSF, and it was not until after the 
first evaluation that it was strongly recommended 
to redirect them towards diffusion, systemic 
interaction of regional actors and the creation of 
absorptive capabilities. Different degrees of 
success in this effort were identified. In an 
extensive evaluation of technology - funding in 
the Objective 1 and Objective 6 areas (CIRCA et 
al. 1999), it was found that, overall, the 
absorption of technology funds improves in LFRs, 
but that conventions need, in most cases, to be 
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Table 1. Evolution of CSF funds dedicated to RTD, Objective 1, 2 and 6, 
selected countries (in MECU and %) 
RTD EU RTD EU % RTD 
1989-93 1994-99 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
Italy 
Ireland 
Portugal 
Total EU· 
3536 
7528 
11677 
8891 
4460 
8450 
49948 
98 
68 
366 
518 
166 
382 
1984 
2.76 
0.9 
3.13 
5.83 
7.73 
4.53 
3.97 
15206 
13980 
28715 
16322 
5620 
13980 
110021 
945 
592 
1821 
1148 
316 
963 
7686 
6.21 
4.23 
6.34 
7.03 
5.62 
6.89 
6.99 
* The total includes few additional LFRs in core countries and is thus higher than the sum of the selected 
countries presented. 
Source: European Report on Science and Technology Indicators, p. 389. 
radically changed to help those regions pass from 
a cheap labour advantage to a learning society. 
In an effort to systematically analyse and 
compare RTDI inputs and outputs in the LFRs the 
study identified five categories of expenditure. 
Although of a very broad nature, several 
conclusions can be drawn from Table 2. First of all, 
the infrastructure and equipment category still 
absorbs a third of all RTDI funds, despite the 
tendency and commitment to move towards soft 
actions. A basic difference from the first CSF is the 
increase in private research activities. In this period 
the higher productivity and effectiveness of 
business research is widely recognized and is 
amply financed. What seems to still suffer 
considerably is the academic category promoted 
by all recent academic evidence (Porter 1990, Best 
1990): technology transfer, innovation and 
networking. Although all member states and 
regions recognized external economies as the 
source of technology spillovers and, as a 
consequence, the key way to link R&D inputs and 
innovation and competitiveness, little was done in 
this area. Not only were the means relatively 
scarce, but à more detailed analysis within this 
category demonstrates that member states and 
regions, often positioned in this category, support 
services of dubious relevance to local networks. 
Table 2. Broad categories of RTDI expenditure in Objective 1 and Objective 6 
regions under the second CSF 
Category 
Infrastructure and equipment 
Public research activities 
Private research activities 
Technology Transfer, Innovation and Networking (public focus) 
Counselling and advisory services (industry focused) 
Human potential, education and training 
Total 
Share (all Obj. 1 and Obj. 6) 
29.7 
14.6 
35.6 
13.4 
0.4 
6.3 
100 
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Although the 
results show that 
the absorption of 
technical funds has 
improved in LFRs, the 
need exists to radically 
change conventions 
to help regions 
pass from a cheap 
labour rationale to a 
learning society one 
Source: CIRCA et al. 1999. 
Whereas there 
has been an increase 
in the funding of 
private research 
activities, Technology 
Transfer, Innovation 
and Networking, 
although recognized as 
fundamental to 
competitiveness and 
economic growth, 
continue to suffer 
from low investment 
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Less favoured 
regions become 
very competitive 
through the rapid and 
appropriate adaptation 
of new knowledge 
Although diffusion is 
seen as the driving 
force which is 
best adapted to LFRs 
it is, however, difficult 
to implement 
Worse still, dissemination for the sake of 
dissemination and networking for the sake of 
networking were frequently observed, instead of 
linking their funding with their linkage with 
businesses. Last but not least, one immediately sees 
the very low level of advisory services, a generally 
recognized priority in SME needs. 
issues and results of the evaluation 
Inputs were identified with growth potential , 
but the crucial question remains: to what extent, 
how and under what circumstances can these 
RTD inputs be effectively used to produce 
economic growth? Otherwise they are only a 
means to strengthen the research system. 
Technology can be a driving force behind 
economic development if: 
• it leads big or technologically leading 
companies to appropriate results early in the 
life cycle of products and thus benefit from 
above average rents (appropriability) 
• it helps individual companies defend their 
market shares or moderately increase them 
through adaptation to technological change 
(individual support measures for innovation 
and technology transfer) 
• it creates spillovers that lead to externalities 
benefiting the whole region (successful 
diffusion). 
Research and technology policies, which are 
designed to create new knowledge, address the first 
of the three points raised above. Innovation and 
technology transfer policies are related but different. 
Their target is the commercialization of new 
products, processes or organizational forms, which 
are new to their environment but not necessarily 
state of the art. Innovation is the cornerstone of 
competition in the learning economy, but com­
panies can be very innovative without major 
research efforts. Even under the most optimistic 
scenarios LFRs are unlikely to demonstrate 
commercial success in state-of-the-art research, yet 
they can become very competitive through the 
rapid and appropriate adaptation of new knowled­
ge. Thus, policies should concentrate on the sus-
tainability of individual competitiveness (a positive, 
yet moderate effect to overall regional growth) and 
on diffusion and the creation of externalities. The 
difficulty lies now in concentrating on this third 
aspect of diffusion. Two issues can be raised: 
• Academic and industrial research teams are 
actively documenting the need for measures 
supporting capacity-enhancement, considering 
it as a first step that will then act as a catalyst for 
the diffusion of knowledge, regardless of the 
vicissitudes of the linear model" in academic 
analyses. This capacity emphasis by research 
teams was stronger under the first CSF and 
although it was sometimes maintained in the 
second, it was complemented with measures 
supporting networking and cluster creation, as 
well as diffusion mechanisms. 
• Often diffusion mechanisms themselves attract 
all the attention and the creation of databases, 
forums, demonstrations and contact points 
become the target instead of the means. There is 
little knowledge about the ultimate success of 
dissemination mechanisms and detailed evalua­
tion would be too costly to pursue. 
As a result, one may assume that from the three 
driving forces mentioned at the beginning of this 
section only the last one is likely to be the one best 
adapted to the structures of less-favoured 
economies and, in addition, this last one is the most 
difficult to implement. Systematic search in all the 
EU Objective 1 regions in the form of quantitative 
evidence combined with case-study research was 
used to identify and put together the relevant 
parameters of the successful cases and regions 
studied, in order to be transferred and have a 
positive impact elsewhere. 
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The most striking results of this experience were 
that, although many countries and regions had 
adopted similar schemes, only a few were identified 
as successful cases. Using evidence from absorp­
tion, mobilization of latent demand and related 
income- generation plus rating from business users, 
the good practices identified were the following: 
1. On agencies and schemes supporting the 
management of RTDI resources: Good management 
for policy implementation by the Irish Forbairt. 
2. Good linkage between State and Regional 
Authorities: in the French Scheme of Regional 
Delegates on Research and Technology. 
3. On industry support schemes: Measure 1 in 
Ireland. 
4. On the idea of shifting from grant to equity or 
repayable loans: CDTI in Spain, Equity considera­
tions in Ireland. 
5. On the activation of the private sector: The 
Federation of Industries of Northern Greece, The 
Industrial Research Group in Ireland. 
6. On the way to improve capacity utilization 
through co-operation: The Irish PATs, The 
Northern Irish ATCs, The Portuguese Research 
Associations in the region of Norte. 
7. On clustering as the best means to increase 
spillovers: Clustering in Saxony. 
Regrouping these best practices with the 
six key themes of the evaluation (capacity 
enhancement, innovation promotion, manage­
ment, learning, funding and policy orientation.) it 
appears on Table 3, and looking at their primary 
(P) and secondary objectives (S), that national 
and regional governments put more emphasis 
on management, innovation and funding and less 
on learning and policies. Yet it is the latter 
that appear in all types of recommendations, 
be it through the systemic approaches or be it 
through the externalities concepts of the neo­
classical theory. 
The limited success stories, geographically 
over-concentrated in Ireland, demonstrate that a 
good administration can be very effective in 
transferring practices. But countries and regions 
have to select "from whom" to learn and "what" 
to learn, as the transferability conditions appear to 
be more important than the effectiveness of each 
particular scheme. 
Table 3. Good practices by theme and their primary (CP) and secondary (S) 
objectives/outcomes 
Forbairt 
Regional 
Delegates 
CDTI 
Equity funds 
Measure 1 
ATCs 
PATs 
Norte 
Federation of 
Industry CM 
IRDG 
Clusters 
in Saxony 
Capacity 
Ρ 
S 
Ρ 
Ρ 
Innovation 
Ρ 
Ρ 
Ρ 
Ρ 
Ρ 
Ρ 
Management 
S 
Ρ 
Ρ 
Ρ 
Ρ 
Ρ 
Ρ 
s 
Ρ 
Learning 
S 
S 
s 
Ρ 
Ρ 
Funding 
Ρ 
Ρ 
Ρ 
s 
s 
s 
Policy 
Ρ 
s 
Ρ 
• 
Source: CIRCA et al. 
The success stories 
geographically 
demonstrate that a 
good administration 
can be very effective 
in transferring 
practices. But 
transferability 
conditions appear 
to be more 
important than the 
effectiveness of each 
particular scheme 
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The lack of 
practical knowledge, 
experimentation 
and policy-copying 
hinder possible 
improvements. 
Help is needed in 
benchmarking, 
clarifying objectives 
and increasing 
social acceptance 
Successful case studies 
highlight the need to 
increase absorptive 
capabilities and 
enhance the 
techniques and 
culture of evaluation 
to overcome 
the tendency to 
substitute accounting 
for evaluation 
Conclusions 
To date, the EU's contribution to emphasizing 
technology as a key component of regional 
development has been very important. But, 
the lack of practical knowledge and 
experimentation, and the tendency of policy 
to copy rather than tailor make measures, 
proves that much remains to be done. RTDI has 
become a key component in regional develop-
ment policies, yet, as in all cases of intangible 
investments, its effective implementation is more 
difficult than in tangible ones. There are 
important steps that the Structural Funds can 
take to further improve RTDI funding in LFRs: 
help benchmarking, help clarify objectives 
through alternative indicators, increase social 
acceptance through training and offer "policy 
minded" studies. 
Particular emphasis needs to be given to 
absorptive capabilities in LFRs. Thus the idea of 
successfully increasing absorptive capabilities 
(Cohen and Levinthai 1989) becomes central to 
technology policies in Objective 1 regions. 
Evaluation techniques and the evaluation culture 
need to be further enhanced, as it was found that, in 
most cases, there is a tendency to substitute 
evaluation with accounting. The most important 
result of such an exercise is feedback within the 
same region and the transfer of good practices. 
Successful case studies were identified, in particular 
those separating policy from management, which 
contributed to increased efficiency and those 
enhancing interaction and thus diminishing 
systemic failures. But transfer of good practice is not 
easy, as the environmental conditions dictate the 
ultimate success of specific measures. _ J p 
Keywords 
RTDI investment, less-favoured regions, capacity enhancement, innovation promotion, funding and 
policy orientation 
Notes 
1- This paper draws substantial ideas from the "Thematic evaluation of the impacts of Structural Funds 
1994/99 on research, technology development and innovation (RTDI) in Objective 1 and 6 regions" 
prepared and coordinated by CIRCA-Dublin, Lena Tsipouri-University of Athens and PriceWaterhouse-
Coopers, The Hague. 
2- For a thorough survey on these issues see Amin, OECD, European Commission. 
3- Although there is broad theoretical agreement that the linear process is an over simplification of the real 
world, and thus one cannot expect R&D inputs to automatically result to technological upgrading of the 
production process, there is little evidence of policy makers doing something radically different than that. 
4- The acronym LFRs, used in the EU to characterise regions with GDP/head lower than 75% of EU 
average is used here to cover equally whole countries (like Greece, Portugal and until the end of this 
century Ireland) but also poor regions in wealthy countries, like Southern Italy or the less prosperous 
parts of Spain. From a broader academic point of view the notion refers to areas that have crossed the 
barriers of underdevelopment, dispose of a general infrastructure and education but are not competitive 
in the global market, as their specialisation deals with low wages rather than learning. 
5- In contrast to the CSF, where funds are allocated with regional development criteria, favouring the 
LFRs, the Framework Programme distributes funds on a merit basis after peer reviewing proposals, 
independently of the origin of the proposers. 
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Subjective aspects 
are not merely 
negative elements. 
In any judgement 
there must be room 
for the intuitive 
insights of experts 
Evaluating the Scientific Excellence 
of Research Programmes: a Pivot 
of Decision-Making 
Anthony F.J. van Raan, centre for Science and Technology Studies, 
university of Leiden 
issue: Excellent scientific work Is the driving force behind S&T breakthroughs. Policy-
makers and research managers maintain that they are well aware of the places of 
excellence, as they are informed by "experts". Expert opinions, however, may be 
Influenced by subjective factors, narrow-mindedness and limited cognitive horizons. 
Relevance: A method is proposed, enabling identification, with a high probability of 
accuracy, scientific excellence in any particular field of R&D and providing a map of all 
major scientific developments directly relevant to that field. The mapping approach even 
provides the possibility of foresight. Particularly at the level of research programmes, 
the method could be an Indispensable tool for decision-making ¡n science policy and 
priority setting. 
The search for excellence 
T he overall process of R&D evaluation, particularly the elements concerning research performance, generally consists of two main components, continuous 
monitoring and ex-post assessment. The method 
presented in this paper offers a novel, powerful 
instrument for both components. 
Peer review undoubtedly has to remain 
the principal procedure of scientific quality 
judgement in the framework of ex-posf assessment. 
But peer review and all related expert-based 
judgements have serious shortcomings and 
disadvantages (Moxham and Anderson, 1992). The 
major problem is, as is well known, subjectivity, 
i.e., dependence of the outcomes on the choice of 
individual peer reviewers. This dependence may 
result in conflicts of interests, a lack of awareness of 
quality or a negative bias against younger people 
and newcomers to the field. A remarkable new 
disadvantage of peer review was discovered in our 
recent studies: the apparent inability or perhaps 
unwillingness to distinguish clearly befween 
top and less-than top research performance (Rinia 
et al 1998). Bibliometric assessment is not infected 
by such crucial disadvantages. Particularly in these 
times of emerging new fields and increasing 
interdisciplinarity, it is not easy for peers to form a 
valid opinion on the performance of those they are 
evaluating. 
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The most crucial parameter in the assessment 
of research performance is international scientific 
influence. This article addresses recently developed 
standardized procedures based on advanced 
bibliometric methods to unambiguously establish 
scientific excellence. Undoubtedly, the biblio­
metric approach is not an ideal instrument, nor one 
which works perfectly in all fields under all 
circumstances. But the approach works well in the 
large majority of the natural, medical, applied and 
behavioural sciences. These fields of science are 
among the most cost­intensive and arguably the 
ones with the strongest socio­economic impact. 
The central question to be answered is whether the 
performance is high or low, and in the case of 
scientific excellence, very high. Thus, measures are 
necessary to identify and assess extraordinary 
performance, particularly when there are signs that 
expert­based judgement alone may not be able to 
realize this crucial assessment. 
Bibliometric assessment of research perfor­
mance is based on one central assumption: 
scientists who have something important to say 
publish vigorously in the open, international 
academic journal literature. Our central statement, 
based on considerable experience, is that the 
search for scientific excellence should be 
performed systematically at the "meso"­level (i.e. 
larger institutions, such as universities or major 
parts of universities, such as large faculties or 
institutes). Also divisions of large national research 
organizations, e.g., the medical or physics division 
of research councils, are suitable levels to start the 
search for excellence. After an overall assessment 
of these larger institutions, the performance 
analysis can be narrowed down to research groups 
and programmes within these institutions. 
The reason for the choice of the meso­level of 
the institution is that on the input­side all necessary 
information, particularly data on personnel and on 
the composition of groups and programmes, are 
readily available. Such institutional infrastructure 
data are not available in general publication 
databases but must always be collected separately 
in relation the institutions concerned. Bibliometric 
analyses performed at the macro­level (e.g., a 
whole country) yield at best general assessments of 
fields as a whole, for instance, how good a 
country's performance is in physics, chemistry, 
psychology or immunology, without a reliable 
breakdown into the individual research groups or 
programmes. 
Therefore, if one wants to identify scientific 
excellence, one has to opt for the institutional level. 
This is simply because scientific research is mostly 
conducted by groups, whether large or small, 
embedded in a specific institution. Thus, the 
institution is the starting point from which to 
accurately identify and monitor scientific 
performance in such a way that it is directly policy­
relevant (e.g. the location of the groups deserving 
support on account of their high quality). 
Outline of the method 
The core of the bibliometric approach can be 
described as follows: Communication, i.e., 
exchange of research results, is a crucial aspect of 
the scientific endeavour. Publications are not the 
only factor, but they are certainly a very important 
component of the knowledge exchange process. 
Work of high quality provokes reactions from 
colleague scientists. These make up an international 
forum, the "invisible college", in which research 
results are discussed. In most cases, these colleague 
scientists play their role as members of the invisible 
college by referring in their own work to earlier 
work of other scientists. The process of citation is a 
complex one, and it certainly does not provide an 
"¡deal" monitor of scientific performance. This is 
particularly the case on a statistically low aggre­
gation level, e.g., just one publication. But the 
application of citation­analysis to the work, the 
Λ 3 1 
For a substantial 
improvement of 
decision­making the 
proposed bibliometric 
method has to 
be used in parallel 
with expert­based 
evaluation procedures 
The institution is the 
starting point from 
which to accurately 
identify and monitor 
scientific performance 
in such a way that it is 
directly policy­relevant 
(e.g. pinpointing high­
quality groups) 
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By searching for 
research groups with 
an impact above a 
specific threshold 
value, scientific 
excellence can be 
detected and 
monitored 
"oeuvre" oi a group as a whole overa longer period 
of time, could yield, in many situations, a strong 
indicator of scientific performance, and in particular 
of scientific quality. One essential condition is that 
applied citation­analysis is part of an advanced, 
technically highly developed bibliometric method. 
As discussed above, this paper will not discuss the 
basics of this methodology, as it is described in great 
detail in recent overview papers (Van Raan 1996, 
1999). The paper focuses on one specific "crown" 
indicator, which relates the measured impact of a 
research group or institute to a worldwide, field­
specific reference value. It is the international stan­
dardized impact indicator as discussed extensively 
in our recent work (the indicator CPP/FCSm1). This 
indicator enables us to observe immediately 
whether the performance of a research group or 
institute is far below (indicator value < 0.5), below 
(indicator value 0.5 ­ 0.8), around (0.8 ­1.2), above 
(1.2 ­ 2.0), or far above (>2.0) the international 
(western world) dominated impact standard of the 
field. In the latter case, a measured impact far above 
the international standard, provides a very strong 
indication of high quality. In other words, by 
searching for research groups with an impact above 
a specific threshold value, scientific excellence can 
be detected and monitored. 
We are developing analytical procedures to 
efficiently conduct such searches on a large scale. 
For instance, in the European Union this would 
mean a bibliometric analysis in each member 
country on the level of larger institutions 
(universities, organizations such as the British 
Medical Research Council, the French CNRS, the 
German Max­Planck Society). On the basis of the 
internal structure of these institutions, a survey of 
the institutional groups is the next and "decisive" 
step. Highly automated routines are essential to 
carry out these performance assessments as 
efficiently as possible. 
Examples of results 
In this paper the application of our method is 
discussed on the basis of "real life" examples. First 
the results for a large medical faculty including a 
university hospital are presented. Next a short 
presentation is given of a similar analysis in the 
physics division of a national research organization. 
The assessments are based on the CPP/FCSm 
indicator, denoted in this paper by IMPACT. 
Table 1 shows a performance trend analysis of 
the medical faculty and university hospital of an 
established and renowned university in a European 
Union member state. As a first but good indication of 
size also the number of publications (in internatio­
nal, refereed journals, as defined in Van Raan 1996, 
1999) is given. This number is about 1,000 per year. 
Table 1. Overall Institutional Survey 
Trend analysis of size in terms in publication output PUBL and of the international 
standardized IMPAC 
Time period 
1988­1991 
1989­1992 
1990­1993 
1991­1994 
1992­1995 
1993­1996 
1994­1997 
PUBL 
3,637 
3,891 
3,988 
4,209 
4,433 
4,559 
4,665 
IMPACT 
1.28 
1.25 
1.22 
1.16 
1.19 
1.26 
1.34 
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The higher the aggregation level, the larger 
the volume in publications and the more difficult 
it is to have an impact significantly above the 
international level. At the "meso-level", an 
IMPACT value above 1.2, such as in this case, 
means that the institution concerned can be 
considered a scientifically strong organization, 
with a high probability of finding very good 
to excellent groups. Thus, the next step in the 
search for excellence is the breakdown of the 
institution into smaller units, i.e., research groups 
and/or programmes. Therefore the bibliometric 
analysis has to be applied on the basis of 
institutional input data on personnel and 
composition of groups. 
The medical faculty provided the names of all 
senior researchers, from 1988, as far as they still 
are employed in 1998, and the allocation of these 
researchers over all research groups and 
programmes (about 100). The bibliometric 
algorithms can now be repeated efficiently on the 
lowest but most important aggregation level, that 
of the research group or research programme. In 
most cases the volume of publications at this level 
is between 10 and 20 per year. Groups with 
IMPACT value > 3.0 can compete easily in their 
field with top-groups at top US universities. If the 
threshold value for the IMPACT indicator is set at 
3.0, we filter out the excellent groups with high 
probability of obtaining accurate results. 
As an example, we shall focus on the last time 
period of the trend analysis (1994-1997, the data 
has been updated for the period 1996-1999). The 
following groups, presented in Table 2, are 
identified immediately. 
In this way five out of the about 100 research 
groups and programmes that can be regarded as 
excellent are identified. Ten groups have an 
IMPACT value between 2.0 and 3.0, which 
classifies them as very good. In total, there are 29 
groups with an IMPACT value above 1.5. 
A further illustration of the method is given in 
the second example. Here the institution is the 
physics division of a national research council 
(van Leeuwen et al 1996). This division has about 
200 research groups and programmes. The results 
of an assessment covering the ten-year period 
1985-1994 are presented here. An update 
assessment for 1996-1999 is in preparation. 
Both the volume of publications and the 
IMPACT va lues for all 200 groups/programmes are 
shown in Fig. 1. We easily observe 13 excellent 
research groups/programmes, i.e., with IMPACT 
value > 3.0. These groups can be identified 
immediately according to the encoding given by 
the research council and used in the analysis. The 
figure nicely illustrates a general finding discussed 
earlier: the larger the unit, the more the average 
Table 2. The search for Scientific Excellence 
Research group 
Blood research: thrombosis, 
genetic coagulation factors 
Immuno-genetics: 
cell membranes, HLA 
Medical imaging 
Clinical Epidemiology 
Molecular and Genetic 
Tumour-pathology 
PUBL 
111 
30 
56 
169 
144 
IMPACT > 3.0 
4.32 
3.12 
4.27 
4.23 
3.49 
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It is important to 
split up larger groups 
and programmes into 
smaller groups to 
allow a more precise 
impact assessment. 
Otherwise, excellent 
work will be 
"hidden" within the 
bulk of a large 
group/programme 
Figure 1. Overall institutional Survey and The Search for Scientific 
Excellence combined 
375 
PUBL 
The abscissa gives the number of papers, the ordinate the value of the IMPACT indicator. Open 
circles: groups/programmes with impact not significantly different f rom the international 
standard which is indicated by the horizontal solid line (IMPACT = 1). Black squares: 
groups/programmes above (below) the international standard. The dotted line represents the 
average (IMPACT = 1.45) of the total of the about 200 physics groups/programmes in the 
physics division of the national research council involved. 
impact of the unit tends to lower (more "average") 
values. Therefore it is important to split up larger 
groups and programmes into smaller groups to 
allow a more precise impact assessment. 
Otherwise, excellent work will be "hidden" within 
the bulk of a large group/programme. 
Landscapes of science: Bibliometric 
mapping 
To conclude, we will take a look at a second 
major line of advanced bibliometric methodology: 
bibliometric mapping. (For a more detailed 
discussion see Noyons and Van Raan, 1998). The 
basic idea is the following. Each year about a 
million scientific articles are published. For just 
one research field, such as micro-electronics, the 
number of papers is already many thousands per 
year. This gives you an impression of the enormous 
size of current scientific output. How is it possible 
to keep track of all these developments? Are there 
cognitive structures "hidden" at a "meta-level" in 
this mass of published knowledge? 
Suppose each research field can be 
characterized by a list of the 100 (for example) 
most important, keywords. For micro-electronics 
research such a list will cover words like circuits, 
electronic structures, lasers, telecommunication, 
opto-electronic devices, radio and television, 
superconductivity, and so on. Each publication can 
be characterized by a subset from the total list of 
keywords. For all micro-electronic publications, 
keyword-lists are compared pair-wise. In other 
words, these many thousand publications 
constitute a gigantic network in which all 
publications are linked together by one of more 
common keywords. The more keywords two 
publications have in common, the more these 
publications are related (keyword-similarity) and 
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thus belong to the same research area or research 
speciality. In mathematical terms, publications are 
represented as vectors in a multi­dimensional 
word­space. In this space they group together, or 
take very distant positions when they are not 
related to each other. 
Special mathematical techniques have been 
developed to unravel these publication networks, 
to cluster related publications, and to map the total 
of clusters in a two­dimensional space in order to 
reveal an underlying structure. The fascinating 
point is that these structures can be regarded as the 
cognitive, or intellectual structure of science. 
Clusters can be identified as sub­fields and research 
themes. As discussed above, the procedure is 
entirely based on the total of relations between all 
publications. Thus, the structures that are 
discovered are not the result of any pre­arranged 
classification system. Nobody prescribed these 
structures. The structures emerge solely from the 
internal relations of the whole universe of 
publications together (given the choice of 
keywords by the analysts). In other words, what is 
made visible by our mathematical methods, is the 
self­organized structure of science. In Figure 2, the 
result for micro­electronics research is shown 
(Noyons et al 1998). The map clearly shows 18 
identified sub­fields in their mutual relationships. 
The closer the clusters are, the more closely related 
the sub­fields represented by these clusters. Major 
sub­fields such as general micro­electronics, 
circuits and design, materials, circuit theory, 
mathematical techniques, liquids, and structure of 
solids can be observed. 
Concluding remarks 
In this article we have discussed an advanced 
method for the clear, objective identification of 
scientific excellence. These bibliometric 
performance indicators offer a useful complement 
Figure 2. Bibliometric map based on shared­word analysis of micro­
electronics research, 1992­1994 
» 10­Tele/Dta Communication 
8­ Optics; Lasers & Masers 
12­ Optical/Optoelec 
Mat & Dev 
5­ Maths Techniques 
\ 15­ Mlcro/Electromagn 
Waves 
9­ Computer Theory, 
Software Eng 
O 
13­ Control Theory/Appl 
2­Circuits & Design /0 .11­ Measuring & 
' Equipment 
Q 16­f Radio/TV/Audio, 
Computer Storage 
'A­ Circuit Theory 
7­ Electon. 
k 1 ­ General M ic ro ­_ l / s t ruc t /p rope r ! Surfaces electronics / ^ \ \ ■ )3\ Materials 
6­ Liquids/Solids 
Structures Q 
18­ Supercond, Magn 
Propert/Struct 
17­ Dielectric (_) 14­ Physical Chemistry 
The map essentially represents a relational structure of clusters of publications, based on cluster­
similarity measures. The clusters can be identified as research fields. The closer the clusters are, 
the more closely related the fields concerned. "White" clusters are characterized by decreasing 
publication activity (worldwide), dark grey clusters by increasing activity. 
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map the total of 
clusters in a two­
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order to reveal an 
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to other evaluation approaches. Bibliometric 
mapping is a powerful tool for visualizing the 
cognitive landscape of an R&D field and its 
surrounding environment. Maps made over a 
series of years reveal trends and changes in 
structure, and extrapolation of a map series can 
act as a "foresight" system for near-future R&D 
developments. 
Furthermore, the position of actors can be put 
on the map. Thus a strategic map is created: who 
is where in science? With help of the performance 
indicators we are able to identify the strongest 
players. Thus, the combination of performance 
assessment and mapping appears to be a very 
powerful tool in the evaluation of research 
activities. 
Changes in maps over time (field structure, 
position of actors) may indicate the impact in 
bibliometric terms of R&D programmes, 
particularly with respect to sub-fields characterized 
by research around social and economic problems. 
Thus the mapping methodology is also applicable 
when examining socio-economic studies of the 
impact of R&D. J P 
Keywords 
research performance, scientific excellence, science policy decision-making, bibliometric method, 
reinforcement of peer review 
Note 
1- Number of "external" citations received by the group or institute per publication over the given period 
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Technology can 
be thought of 
as comprising 
three separable 
components: the 
"artefact" component, 
or improvements in 
production techniques, 
together with skills and 
knowledge. Evaluation 
tends to concentrate 
only on the first 
of these 
Evaluating the impact of Technology 
Transfers f rom Public Research 
Laboratories to Private Firms 
Serge Petit, IMRI, Vincent Vigneron, CEMIF 
issue: Research laboratories are Increasingly coming under pressure to evaluate the 
economic Impact of their research, in many cases it is unclear which criteria should be 
used for these evaluations, and exploratory steps need to be taken. 
Relevance: Existing evaluation indicators are poorly equipped to grasp the essential 
characteristics of innovative activities. Results of recent research suggest there are 
certain stable patterns linking various types of Impacts and their determinants. 
The theoretical background 
T he theoretical argument that underlies this paper is the acknowledgement that technology cannot be reduced to a piece of formalized information, but that 
technology is made of three constituents that can 
exist independently of each other, and each can 
impact firms on different levels. The "artefact" 
dimension is the aspect that evaluation is often 
most concerned with, since improvements in 
production techniques are perceived to be a sine 
qua non in the ongoing search for industrial 
competitiveness. But the other dimensions, 
namely skills and knowledge, are often left out, 
despite technological development's heavy 
reliance upon them. In fact, disembodied 
knowledge spills over more easily (to other 
activities) than knowledge embodied in use-
specific products. This legitimates the idea that the 
impact of technology is likely to extend beyond 
the scope of traditional evaluation. Add to that the 
possibilities for technological recombinations, and 
then technology ends up as a potentially pervasive 
phenomenon that is generally improperly captured 
by the prevailing indicators'. This article puts 
forward complementary evaluation indicators. 
The empirical research: data collection 
and methodology 
It is clear that this renewed conception of 
evaluation cannot be thought of independently of 
new methods of data collection and processing. A 
purely confirmatory evaluation checking whether 
predefined objectives have been met appears to 
be inadequate for two reasons: 
1. There is a lack of clearly formulated colla-
boration objectives. Official programme objectives 
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are usually too general (contribution to industrial 
wealth creation and unemployment reduction) to 
be used for individual project evaluations. The 
laboratories working guidelines are exclusively 
formulated in technical terms. The collaboration 
contracts between the laboratories and the 
contracting firms, in most cases, do not mention 
any specific objectives either. Thus, it is unclear 
which criteria projects could be evaluated against. 
2. Lacking the experience of former evaluations 
and considering the properties of technology, it 
would be over hasty to assume that no surprising 
results could emerge from R&D collaborations. 
Hence reducing the "domain" of possible impacts 
according to predefined criteria seems a ques­
tionable way of proceeding. 
Hence, an exploratory evaluation is necessary. 
An evaluation of this type has been carried out 
based on a sample of twenty­two R&D colla­
borations between CEA laboratories and firms 
of different sizes. All collaborations have taken 
place between 1975 and 1994, allowing for at 
least four years of commercial exploitation before 
evaluation. The technological domains covered 
are very diverse (microelectronics, opto­electro­
nics, materials sciences, industrial process 
optimization, etc.). For the details of the sample, 
see Table 1. 
Empirical data were gathered through a series 
of monographs that included document analysis 
and face­to­face interviews with project leaders. 
Instead of relying on an exclusively pre­set formal 
Table 1. The sample content (code of company name, transferred 
technology, data of R&D collaboration) 
Event 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Partner 
firm 
ALC1 
ALC2 
BRU 
CEN 
COR 
IBA 
IC 
SGM2 
SGM1 
SCA 
SES 
SOPÌ 
SOP2 
SOP3 
TCS 
DEN 
NIP 
SGI 
SICN1 
SICN2 
T+C 
VIC 
Technology transferred 
Engraving processes 
Reactors 
Cytoflourimetry 
Massively parallel processing 
Hygrometer 
Electron accelerator 
X tomography 
Massively parallel processing 
Bubble memories 
Strain gauges 
Polishing process 
Location electronics 
Rectangular detector 
Specialized electronics 
Monolayer CCD 
Wood densification 
PVD coating 
PVD 
PVD 
PVC 
Bimetal junctions 
Plate junctions 
R&D collaboration 
details 
84­88 
84­87 
82­84 
91­94 
80­81 
91­93 
83­86 
93­97 
76­80//88­89 
79­80 
94­95 
86­87 
87­88 
89­93 
86­92 
87­95 
82­87 
86­87 
86­88 
90­92 
81­85 
78­84 
The face­to­face 
interviews have made 
it possible to grasp 
contextual —often 
highly qualitative­
elements that 
are necessary to 
understand the 
relationship 
between the 
laboratory and 
the firm 
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The results of the study 
include both evaluation 
indicators that account 
for the impact of R&D 
collaborations and the 
functional relationships 
between them 
The indicators are 
constructed through a 
sort of "dialogue" 
between the empirical 
evidence gathered and 
the more conceptual 
and theoretical 
requirements of the 
evaluation literature 
methodology, the logical requirements of the task 
have been explored. General topics (motivations 
to collaborate, merits of CEA technology, induced 
effects, etc.) have been investigated along with 
the answers to precise pre-formulated questions. 
The face-to-face interviews have made it possible 
to grasp contextual -often highly qualitative-
elements that are necessary to understand the 
relationship between the laboratory and the firm. 
In general there is little data available on R&D 
collaborations apart from that given in the 
archived contracts. The memory of the early 
collaborations is progressively vanishing as the 
people involved retired or moved on to new jobs. 
Retrospectively, access to data has proved to be a 
labour-intensive and time-consuming exercise. 
The quality of insight into the different 
companies is uneven, depending on the number 
of people that were prepared to participate 
(between 2 and 7 per monograph). In order to 
have the most reliable information possible, 
participants were asked to validate the written 
report of the interview. As a general rule, the 
targeted participants were the projects leaders 
themselves, whether in the laboratory or in the 
firm. Generally speaking, their cooperation was 
good considering that the collaborations often lay 
far back in time. 
The results 
Two levels of results were established: 
1. evaluation indicators that account for the 
impact of R&D collaborations were elaborated; 
2. functional relationships between these impact 
indicators and a set of structural variables (such 
as the profile of the firm, the configuration of the 
collaboration, and the type of innovation that the 
company wished to launch with the laboratory's 
support) were established. 
Constructing impact indicators 
Based on a set of empirical observations2, 
variables have been elaborated that are not the 
result of an aggregation of individual effects into a 
single metric, but so-called "conceptual con-
tractions", mapping effects induced by innovation 
onto a set of evaluation criteria. The procedure rests 
on the experience and "naturalistic generalization"3 
of one's accumulated tacit knowledge as an 
evaluator that makes it possible to deal with hard-to-
quantify aspects (e.g. to understand metaphors). 
"Tacit knowledge includes a multitude of 
inexpressible associations that give rise to new 
meanings, new ideas, and new applications of the 
old4". Of course, this way of proceeding may not 
include all the individual effects, but as the 
elaborated criteria are meant to serve as a 
methodological basis for future evaluations, a 
certain level of generality has to be accepted. 
The indicators are constructed through a sort 
of "dialogue" between the empirical evidence 
gathered and the more conceptual and theoretical 
requirements of the evaluation literature. 
There are two types of indicator: 
The first set of indicators is supposed to reflect 
the project's contribution to the achievement of 
the mission's overall objectives. The following 
indicators were selected: 
• the innovation-induced turnover related to the 
turnover of the concerned business unit (CAi); 
• the durability of the average innovation-
related turnover (PERCAi); 
• the effect of innovation on the firm's 
employment level (EMB). 
The second set of indicators takes into account 
recurrent effects of R&D collaborations that are 
not accounted for by the first set. Four indicators 
were selected: 
• the level of capitalization on transferred 
knowledge (CAP); 
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• the level of intrafirm diffusion (EXT); 
• the reputation effects (REPUT); 
• the effect on the firm's competence building 
(FONDS). 
However, the procedure used is open to 
challenge: 
1. one can argue that it is not the evaluator's role 
to set the evaluation criteria; 
2. the construction of monograph-based criteria/ 
variables based on "naturalistic generalization" 
depends on the unique experience of the evaluator. 
Considering the lack of data, there is hardly any 
way around this. 
The elaboration of the various impact 
dimensions is a first result of the empirical 
analysis, based on the need to grasp technology 
and innovation in their material and immaterial 
dimensions. 
The links between the impacts and 
their determinants 
This study is not limited to describing the 
impacts. Each R&D collaboration in the sample is 
described through an array of variables that 
supposedly intervene in the generation of these 
impacts. There are three "blocks" of variables: 
• the "profile of the firm" is described by its size 
(SIZ) and its skill base (COMPE); 
• the "collaboration" is described by the rype of 
relationship (REL), the organizational 
configuration (CONFIG), the position of the 
collaboration in the innovation process (POS) 
and its complexity (COMPX); 
• the "launched innovation" is described by its 
commercial objective (DYN) and the time lag 
between the end of the collaboration and the 
launch of the innovation (DELAI). 
The dependence links between the different 
variables have been tested through a regular Chi-
2 test at a 10% level of confidence (see Table 2). 
These links can be mapped (see Figure 1) in a 
single chart. A couple of remarkable patterns 
emerge from this representation, and five 
"associations" particularly catch the attention as 
they suggest strong links between the concerned 
variables. All five associations display stable 
configurations5. Without discussing the details of 
the findings, the main conclusions that emerge 
from each pattern will be presented. 
1. SIZ - FONDS - CAÍ : this pattern suggests a 
strong relationship between the size of the 
company, the impact of the R&D collaboration on 
the firm's competence building and the 
innovation-induced turnover. The smaller the 
firm, the stronger these effects appear. 
2. SIZ - REL - CAÍ suggests that the "new 
partners6" of CEA tend to be small companies, and 
that these collaborations generate relatively impor-
tant amounts of turnover for the firms concerned. 
3. REL - CAi - PERCAi suggests that the 
collaborations with "new partners" tend to induce 
relatively important and long-lasting increases in 
turnover. 
4. COMPE - FONDS - EXT suggests the 
existence of a link between the preexisting skills 
base of the firm, the competence building through 
the collaboration, and the diffusion of the new 
knowledge in the firm. The presence of technical 
skills appears to be a condition for the building of 
new competencies and the spreading of the new 
knowledge in the firm. 
5. COMPE - CONFIG - DYN indicate an 
articulation between the preexisting skills base of 
the firm, the organizational configuration of the 
collaboration and the commercial objective that 
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Table 2. The results of the Chl­2 test 
p­value 
SIZ 
COMPE 
COMPX 
POS 
CONFIG 
REL 
DYN 
DELAI 
CAi 
PERCAi 
EMB 
CAP 
EXT 
FONDS 
REPUT 
1. Profile 
SIZ 
66,20% 
3,80% 
37,70% 
86,00% 
3,90% 
1 7,60% 
45,70% 
3,90% 
58,60% 
11,407,, 
3,00% 
31,00% 
8,40% 
6,507» 
COMPE 
95,60% 
79,607o 
6,30% 
66,707η 
3,50% 
68,80% 
24,60% 
85,907ο 
20,807ο 
29,507ο 
6,10% 
5,50% 
48,207ο 
2. Collaboration 
COMPX 
23,107ο 
28,507ο 
30,107ο 
30,107ο 
72,507ο 
21,207ο 
12,407ο 
39,107ο 
15,10% 
21,10% 
45,207„ 
79,307ο 
POS 
60,107ο 
66,607ο 
68,007ο 
45,60% 
87,50% 
65,707ο 
0,307« 
8,807ο 
85,707ο 
78,607ο 
27,707ο 
CONFIG 
11,70% 
1,20% 
67,107ο 
37,907ο 
55,907ο 
18,407ο 
60,307ο 
53,607ο 
84,807ο 
35,10% 
REL 
57,407ο 
9,80% 
1,80% 
7,707ο 
8,207ο 
13,107ο 
17,707ο 
35,307ο 
46,607ο 
3. Innovation 
DYN 
28,107ο 
26,907ο 
60,307ο 
23,007ο 
43,107ο 
72,907ο 
72,107ο 
64,60% 
DELAI 
29,10% 
15,30% 
22,40% 
87,10% 
72,507ο 
28,207ο 
46,207ο 
4. Induced effects 
CAi 
0,00% 
24,907ο 
31,60% 
21,507ο 
9,607ο 
14,407ο 
PERCAi 
64,407ο 
68,807ο 
88,507ο 
87,007ο 
24,307ο 
ΕΜΒ 
26,60':;, 
87,607ο 
35,407ο 
78,307ο 
CAP 
45,707ο 
30,00% 
17,307ο 
ΕΧΤ 
1,007ο 
79,307ο 
FONDS 
26,207ο 
REPUT 
All the variables have been tested by pairs. Among the 106 
squares in the chart. It appears that all variables of a same ' 
relationships that have been tested, 20 are relations of 
block" are independent of each other, i.e. there is no 
dependence at a level of confidence of 10. These are the dark 
redundant information in the variables of the "block". 
o 
o 
co 
o 
O 
3 
θ­
α) 
to 
(Ο 
to 
N O . 4 O D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 9 T h e I P T S R e p o r t 
Figure 1. Synopsis of the relationships between dependent variables 
PERCAi CAi FONDS EXT 
COMPE 
COMPX 
CAP 
REPUT 
EMB 
POS 
CONFIG 
DELAI 
DYN 
P-value between 5-10% 
P-value <5% 
SIZ, COMPE = Firm profile 
CONFIG, POS, COMPX, REL = Collaboration 
DYN, DELAI = Innovation 
CAi, PERCAi, EMB, CAP, EXT, FONDS, REPUT = Induced effects 
drives the innovation project. Three scenarios can 
be identified: 
• firms with preexisting (technological and 
commercial) capabilities tend to get involved 
in intense cooperation schemes that allow 
them to be constantly connected with the 
latest technological developments in order to 
remain on the leading edge of their market; 
• firms with a set of relevant technological 
capabilities tend to link up with a 
complementary capability set in order to share 
the risks of diversification; 
• firms with commercial opportunities in their 
existing business tend to externalize the 
developments that allow them to take a 
competitive leap. 
Conclusions 
The results suggest that the impact variables do 
not depend on the "innovation" variables and the 
only variables that intervene directly in the impact 
generation process are SIZ, COMPE, REL. This 
suggests that it may be possible for project leaders in 
public laboratories to influence the industrial 
impact generation process by choosing the "right" 
partner. Indeed, small companies (less than 100 
people) seem to be particularly able to benefit from 
R&D collaborations in commercial terms. And the 
presence -in the partner firm- of a relevant techno-
logical background intervenes as leverage in the use 
and dissemination of new technological knowledge. 
Two lessons can be learned from these results: 
1. The underlying analysis supports the hypothesis 
that technology encompasses immaterial dimen-
sions and indicators have been developed that 
account for the impacts generated by the latter. 
2. Independently of the contingencies that might 
blur the evidence, one finds that the public R&D 
programme administrators can generate impacts for 
collaborating firms, impacts which are not merely a 
matter of chance: there is some scope for 
intervention and this research project has tried to 
identify the structural conditions. _^^ 
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Notes/References 
1- CEA evaluates the market impact of its R&D collaborations by the innovation-induced turnover that 
the industrial partner generates on the basis of the newly acquired technological knowledge. 
2- Generally qualitative appraisals on Likert-scales, or free text appraisals. 
3- "Naturalistic generalization" is arrived at by "recognizing the similarities of objects and issues in and 
out of context and by sensing the natural co variations of happenings". 
4- Stake (1978), p.6, ¡n : Shadish, W.R. Jr., Cook, T.D., and Levitón, L.C., (1991) Foundations of Program 
Evaluation, Theories of Practice, Newbury Park, CA : Sage Publications. 
5- The stability of the triangular relations has been tested through the introduction of a variable that 
depends on one of the associated variables. The results can be provided by the authors upon request. 
6- "New partners" are those whose links with the CEA are closely connected to a special technological 
development, whereas the "usual partners" are those companies the CEA has been involved with 
throughout the nuclear mission. 
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A B O U T T H E I P T S 
The IPTS is one of the eight institutes of the Joint Research Centre of the EU Commission. Its remit 
is the observation and follow-up of technological change in its broadest sense, in order to 
understand better its links with economic and social change. The Institute carries out and co-
ordinates research to improve our understanding of the impact of new technologies, and their 
relationship to their socio-economic context. 
The purpose of this work is to support the decision-maker in the management of change pivotally 
anchored on S/T developments. In this endeavour IPTS enjoys a dual advantage: being a part of the 
Commission IPTS shares EU goals and priorities; on the other hand it cherishes its research institute 
neutrality and distance from the intricacies of actual policy-making. This combination allows the 
IPTS to build bridges betwen EU undertakings, contributing to and co-ordinating the creation of 
common knowledge bases at the disposal of all stake-holders. Though the work of the IPTS is 
mainly addressed to the Commission, it also works with decision-makers in the European 
Parliament, and agencies and institutions in the Member States. 
The Institute's main activities, defined in close cooperation with the decision-maker are: 
1. Technology Watch. This activity aims to alert European decision-makers to the social, economic 
and political consequences of major technological issues and trends. This is achieved through the 
European Science and Technology Observatory (ESTO), a European-wide network of nationally 
based organisations. The IPTS is the central node of ESTO, co-ordinating technology watch "joint 
ventures" with the aim of better understanding technological change. 
2. Technology, employment & competitiveness. Given the significance of these issues for Europe 
and the EU institutions, the technology-employment-competitiveness relationship is the driving 
force behind all IPTS activities, focusing analysis on the potential of promising technologies for job 
creation, economic growth and social welfare. Such analyses may be linked to specific 
technologies, technological sectors, or cross-sectoral issues and themes. 
3. Support for policy-making. The IPTS also undertakes work to supports both Commission services 
and other EU institutions in response to specific requests, usually as a direct contribution to 
decision-making and/or policy implementation. These tasks are fully integrated with, and take full 
advantage of on-going Technology Watch activities. 
As well as collaborating directly with policy-makers in order to obtain first-hand understanding of 
their concerns, the IPTS draws upon sector actors' knowledge and promotes dialogue between 
them, whilst working in close co-operation with the scientific community so as to ensure technical 
accuracy. In addition to its flagship IPTS Report, the work of the IPTS is also presented in occasional 
prospective notes, a series of dossiers, synthesis reports and working papers. 
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